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THE TEXAS PENAL CODE OF 1974
by
Charles P. Bubany*
9 3was an important year for the substantive criminal law of Texas.1973 Amid the controversy over capital punishment and drugs, the legis-
lature substantially revised the Texas Penal Code for the first time since its
enactment in 1856.'
The contribution of the new Code to rational and enlightened administra-
tion of criminal justice in this state is substantial, but it should not be over-
stated. Only "significant penal law" is Teformed by the Code;2 many stat-
utes that merely employ a penal sanction were simply transferred to "ap-
propriate places within the framework of Texas statute law."'  As a result,
the Code has increased, without revising, the constantly growing mass of
statutes scattered throughout the civil statutes which impose fines and im-
prisonment.4 A large share of 'these statutes are of a regulatory nature
rather than proscriptions of hard core criminality, and many violations are
not prosecuted. Nevertheless, they constitute the majority of criminal stat-
utes in this state, and remain virtually unaffected by the new Code., It
should not be concluded that even that part of the penal law affected by
the revision has been reformed either radically or completely. Substantive
reform of some problem areas was neither achieved nor 'attempted. Con-
ceptual and verbal inadequacies still exist.
* B.A., St. Ambrose College; J.D., Washington University (St. Louis). Associ-
ate Professor of Law, Texas Tech University.
1. Keeton & Searcy, A New Penal Code for Texas, 33 TEx. B.J. 580 (1970).
The recodifications of 1879, 1895, 1911, and 1925 involved only formal revision rather
than efforts to rationalize and restructure the whole penal code. Committee Foreword
to STATE BAR COMMITTEE ON REVISION OF THE PENAL CODE, TEXAS PENAL CODE: A
PROPOSED REVISION at III (Final Draft, Oct. 1970) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED
DRAFT]. The new Texas Penal Code was approved on June 14, 1973, and became
effective on Jan. 1, 1974. Texas Penal Code, ch. 399, [1973] Tex. Laws 883 [here-
inafter cited, as TEX. PENAL CODE and referred to in the text as the "Code" or "new
Code"]. In addition to the State Bar Committee Comments in the PROPOSED DRAFT,
the following works relied on by the author are recommended for their discussion of
the general principles and problems stated herein: G. DIx & M. SHARLOT, CRIMINAL
LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS (1973) [hereinafter cited as Dix & SHARLOT]; W. LAFAVE
AND A. Scor, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW (1972) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE &
SCOTT].
2. Committee Foreword to PROPOSED DRAFT at IV.
3. Ch. 399, § 5(a), [1973] Tex. Laws 995.
4. This conclusion is drawn from a study being conducted by the author with re-
search support from the Texas Criminal Justice Council, and Texas Organized Research
Funds. Preliminary findings indicate the existence of over 500 such statutes, establish-ing a range of punishments from one day to life in prison and fines as great as
$20,000.
5. The Penal Code could affect interpretation of these statutes, however, since the
general principles of titles 1, 2, and 3 of the Code are made applicable to these other
statutory provisions. See note 8 infra, and accompanying text.
The legislature annually contributes to the proliferation of penal statutes outside the
Penal Code. 1973 was no exception. See Cumulative Index to Laws 1973, chs. 400-658, [19731 Tex. Laws A-286 to -287. Even the Texas Controlled Substances Act,
discussed at notes 233-37 infra, was not enacted as part of the Penal Code.
TEXAS PENAL CODE OF 1974
The lack of radical change and the existence of defects should not ob-
scure the fact that in light of the obstacles to meaningful revision, the degree
of order, rationality, simplicity, and clarity achieved in the now Code is re-
markable. Indeed, one of the new Code's major attributes is a structure
and format that will tend to highlight defects and facilitate the process of
amendment. But perhaps its most significant feature is the analytical ap-
proach suggested by the rationalized and restructured formal organization.
The Code follows the trend of modern legislation of adopting and stating
at the outset the general principles and definitions that are applicable
throughout. Even within the chapters which define specific offenses, a great
deal of emphasis is placed on introducing the chapter with definitions appli-
cable only to that part of -the Code. This approach simplifies drafting and
saves space. More importantly, it helps to provide the necessary back-
ground and facility for understanding the application of provisions relating
to the specific offenses.
In chapter 1 of title 1, the objectives, principles of construction, and defi-
nitions that are applicable throughout the Code are stated. Burden of proof
is treated in chapter 2 and multiple prosecution is dealt with in chapter 3.
Probably the most important major section of the Code is title 2 (chapters
6-9), which sets forth the "General Principles of Criminal Responsibility"
that are fundamental to ,all types of offenses. Chapters 6 and 7 of title
2 define the basic components of criminal liability, including criminal "act,"
culpable mental states, causation, complicity, and corporate liability. Chap-
ters 8 and 9 set forth the 'basic law on excuses or defenses. Title 3 (chapter
12) is devoted entirely to definition of the various grades of offenses and
the potential punishment involved in each. The inchoate offenses-attempt,
conspiracy, solicitation, and possession of criminal instruments-are con-
tained in title 4 (chapters 15 and 16). The remaining titles define specific
criminal offenses, grouping them according to the harm they inflict: offenses
against the person in title 5 (chapters 19-22), offenses against the family
in title 6 (chapter 25); offenses against property in title 7 (chapters 28-
32), offenses against public administration in title 8 (chapters 36-39), of-
fenses against public order 'and decency in title 9 (chapters 42 and 43),
and finally, offenses against public health, safety, and morals are treated
in title 10 (chapters 46 and 47).
I. INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS (TITLE 1)
A. Scope: Legislative Supremacy, Legality, Preemption, and Jurisdiction
By declaring th'at conduct is not an offense unless so defined by statute
or other legislative act, the Code supersedes all common-law offenses and
reaffirms the so-called principle of "legality," that there can be no crime
without law.6 Although the Code does not include all Texas penal law, it
is established as the preeminent body of law applicable to all the activities
covered by its provisions. Any other law, whether a state penal statute,
6. TEx. PmA CODE § 1.03, expressed in the maxim nullem crimen sine lege.
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a municipal ordinance, or an administrative rule or regulation, is of no effect
to the extent that it overlaps, duplicates, or conflicts with a Code provision.7
Furthermore, the general principles of the Code are made applicable
to penal statutes found outside the Code, unless the non-Code statutes pro-
vide otherwise. However, the penalty attached to a non-Code statute re-
mains applicable unless the statute has been classified according to the
scheme of punishments in title 3 of the Code.8 In any case, the power of
a court to enforce civil remedies, such as license suspension or cancellation,
penalties, forfeitures, or damages is unaffected, and the court may include
them in the criminal sentence. 9
In section 1.04 the Code expands Texas criminal jurisdiction to what ap-
pears to be the permissible constitutional limit. 10  The state has territorial
jurisdiction over the land and water, and air space above it. It has jurisdic-
tion over offenses, any element of which occurs inside this state; out-of-state
attempts to commit offenses inside the state; out-of-state conspiracies, if an
act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs inside the state; and, any offense
under the law of another state that is also an offense in Texas, if any con-
duct-including an "attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy" or other conduct
that "establishes criminal responsibility" for its commission--occurs in
Texas. Section 1.04 permits assertion of jurisdiction over homicides if either
the impact causing death or the death itself occurs in the state. To over-
come problems of proof when the finding of a body in this state is the sole
basis for assertion of jurisdiction, the Code establishes a rebuttable presump-
tion that the death occurred in this state. When death alone is the basis
for jurisdiction, it is a defense to a prosecution in this state that the con-
duct resulting in death was not criminal in the state where it occurred. The
Code's jurisdictional provision also establishes jurisdiction over offenses
based on omissions to perform a duty if that duty was imposed on the actor
by a statute of this state. This provision probably will 'have its primary ap-
plication in the domestic relations offenses of non-support and child deser-
tion."
B. Interpretation of the Code
The common-law rule of strict construction of penal statutes is expressly
abolished by the Code. In its place is substituted a canon of construction
that the Code's provisions "shall be construed according to the fair import
of their terms, to promote justice and effect the objectives of the code.' 2
This "fair construction" notion is supplemented by incorporating by refer-
ence selected provisions of the Texas Code Construction Act.18 Although
7. Id. § 1.03; PRoPosED) DRAFT § 1.03, Comments at 6-7.
8. TEx. PENAL CODE § 1.03(b).
9. Id. §§ 1.03(c), 12.01(c).
10. PROPosED DRAFT § 1.04, Comments at 8-9.
11. Id. at 10.
12. TEx. PENAL CODE § 1.05(a).
13. Id. § 1.05(b); Code Construction Act, Tax. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5429b-
2, §§ 2.01-.02, 2.04-.05, 3.01-.12 (Supp. 1974). This provision may be used to resolve
a conflict in language between provisions of TEx. PENAL CODE § 8.07 and TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 51.02 (Supp. 1974) relating to jurisdiction of juvenile offenders. Both
[Vol. 28
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the rule of strict construction apparently has been used "only to support a
decision already made on other grounds,"'14 its abandonment is salutary.
Strained interpretations of criminal statutes in the past have led to distor-
tions of substantive criminal law.15 Hopefully, the new Code will lessen the
need and discourage the temptation to indulge in technical interpretations
that seek to avoid the supposed harshness of a literal application of statu-
tory language.
The comments of the Committee of the State Bar on Revision of the Code
will be an invaluable aid to the interpretation of numerous provisions of the
Code, at least those comments relating to "provisions unchanged during leg-
islative consideration."' 6 Even in those instances in which provisions differ-
ent from those in the draft were enacted, the comments may prove helpful.
The rejection of the Proposed Draft provision in itself could be persuasive
evidence of the legislative intent to avoid the result that the drafters indi-
cated in the comments would occur under the proposed section. Where it
is evident that the proposed draft would have changed prior law, its rejec-
tion might be strong evidence of a desire to conform to the prior law as
interpreted by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.' 7
Finally, court decisions of other jurisdictions interpreting provisions simi-
lar to Texas Code provisions or comment and commentary on borrowed
provisions, such as the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, may provide use-
ful benchmarks of the Code's interpretation.' 8
C. Objectives of the Code
The objective of the old Code was tersely stated: its purpose was "to
prevent crime and reform the offender."' 9  In section 1.02 the new Code
attempts to provide a more specific and complete statement of objectives
that will be of some benefit in the interpretation and application of its pro-
visions. 20  The agreement as to the general objectives reflected in section
1.02 tends to conceal the pervasive conflict of values and widely divergent
philosophies involved in the administration of the penal law, but the lan-
guage gives a clue to the underlying conflict.
statutes make age 17 the dividing line between juvenile court jurisdiction and potential
criminal court jurisdiction. However, TEX. PENAL CODE § 8.07(b) makes jurisdiction
dependent on age at the time of the proceedings, while TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02(Supp. 1974) makes it hinge on age at the time of the offense. For an opinion that
a fair construction consistent with the Code Construction Act would establish the Fam-
ily Code test as authoritative, see the final section of Dawson, Delinquent Children
and Children in Need of Supervision: Draftsman's Comments to Title 3 of the Texas
Family Code, 5 TEx. TECH. L. REV. (No. 2 1974) (not yet published).
14. PROPosED DRAFT § 1.05, Comments at 11.
15. Levine, The New York Penal Law: A Prosecutor's Evaluation, 18 BUFFALO
L. REv. 269, 273 (1969). See generally Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal
Statutes, 48 HARv. L. REv. 748 (1935).
16. PROPOSED DRAFr § 1.05, Comments at 12.
17. This seems quite obvious, for example, in the attempt statute, discussed infra
at notes 189, 190.
18. The authors of the PROPOSED Dar drew on the law reform efforts of over
half the states, the federal government, and the American Law Institute (Model Penal
Code). Committee Foreword to PROPOSED DRAFT at VIII.
19. Ch. 1, art. 1, [1925] Penal Code of Texas 3 (repealed 1973).
20. TEx. PENAL CODE § 1.02; PROPOSED DRAFT § 1.02, Comment at 4.
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The general purpose of the Code is "to deal with conduct. . . that causes
or threatens harm to those individuals or public interests for which state pro-
tection is ,appropriate, ' 21 but it also directs that criminal responsibility shall
attach only to conduct that "unjustifiably and inexcusably," or with "guilt"
causes or threatens harm. This dual purpose suggests that a continuing con-
troversy has not been solved: Should the penal law 'be committed to a sub-
jective theory of criminal liability that emphasizes ,the "responsibility" or
moral guilt of the actor; 22 or more appropriately and pragmatically, should
it focus on harm and objective manifestations of criminality, while limiting
the law's inquiry into an actor's subjective state of mind?23
The statement of objectives also indicates an ultimate conflict in concepts
of the administration of penal statutes. The goal of the Code, unchanged
from that of prior law, is "to insure the public safety" by prevention or de-
terrence of criminal conduct, and the rehabilitation of individual offenders. 24
This is thought to be achieved by inculcating in the offender a sense of why
he is being punished, 'by giving him fair warning of what is prohibited and
of the consequences of violation, 25 while at the same time allowing sufficient
flexibility to "permit recognition of differences in rehabilitation possibilities
among individual offenders .. ".. ,26 Consistent with this goal, the drafters
expressed a desire that the Code would "guide and limit the exercise of offi-
cial discretion in law enforcement to prevent arbitrary or oppressive treat-
ment of persons accused or convicted of offenses."'27 Unfortunately, how-
ever, the new Code does little to engender confidence that it will have any
substantial bearing on whether the discretion of law enforcement officials
will be exercised either wisely or well.
As has become increasingly apparent, the criminal justice system is be-
coming less an adversary system and more a system of post-arrest negotia-
tion in which the vast majority of cases are settled prior to trial.28 In this
21. TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.02.
22. A basic assumption of the penal law is that normal individuals are morally re-
sponsible for their actions because they possess free will. However, the term "liabil-
ity," rather than the "responsibility" of the Code, is used herein to refer to the judg-
ment in law that a person may be found guilty of crimes and subjected to punishment.
Usage of "liability" is thought preferable since in many instances the moral responsibil-
ity of the actor may be deemed irrelevant.
23. The philosophical conflict is treated in detail in Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsid-
ered: A Plea for a Due Process Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REV.
322 (1966). A complete commitment to an actor-oriented criminal law seems unlikely
in the face of the typical legislator's sensitivity to public feeling and the charge of "cod-
dling" criminals. See Cohen, Reflections on the Revision of the Texas Penal Code,
45 TEXAS L. REv. 413, 415-16 (1967).
24. Tx. PENAL CODE § 1.02(1).
25. Id. § 1.02(2). This also is a requirement for satisfaction of the due process
clause. United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
U.S. 451 (1939); Horak v. State, 95 Tex. Crim. 474, 255 S.W. 191 (1923); see Baker
v. State, 478 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (partially striking down a prior va-
grancy law).
26. TEx. PENAL CODE § 1.02(3). In the popular jargon, this is "individualized
treatment"-making the punishment fit the criminal-as well as making it "proportion-
ate to the seriousness" of the crime. Id.
27. Id. § 1.02(5).
28. Dash, Preface to The United States Courts of Appeals: 1971-1972 Term
(Criminal Law and Procedure), 61 GEo. L.J. 275, 280-84 (1972); see D. NEWMAN,
CoNvICIoN: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966);
[Vol. 28
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milieu, the discretion of the prosecutor is virtually unfettered. 29  The new
Code will not inhibit this trend, 'and may even encourage it in two respects.
First, plea bargaining will be encouraged by the extensive use of degree clas-
sifications in the definition of offenses. Numerous basic offenses are defined
in ascending order with the lowest degree set out first.30  Second, the wide
range of available punishments authorized for each grade of offense tends
to provide the prosecutor leverage in the bargaining process. To some ex-
tent the discretion exercised by prosecutors 'and the police is motivated by
a desire to individualize -the consequences of a criminal conviction.31  The
most commonly asserted justification for plea bargaining, however, is its util-
ity in disposing of the large number of criminal cases that clog the dockets3 2
Clearly, m'uch of plea bargaining is 'a matter of routine, and in many cases
bears little or no relation to the facts of the case, the correctional needs of
the defendant, or the social interest served by vigorous prosecution. 3 Even
in those cases in which the law enforcement officials desire to fashion a dis-
position that fits the offender and his offense, no guidelines for doing so
exist.34  Hence, the administration of the penal law in this state and the
accomplishment of its objectives continues to depend heavily on the compe-
tence and good faith of law enforcement officials, particularly that of the
prosecutor.
D. Definitions
In section 1.07 definitions are given for thirty-two different terms. Four
other terms relating to culpable mental states are listed, but their definition
is accomplished by reference to section 6.03. The definitions 'have little in-
dependent significance, but all have critical importance in the context of spe-
cific code provisions. For example, two terms, "person"' and "individual,"
are significant because of the Code's expansion of corporate liability. When
an offense imposes criminal liability on ,an "individual," the offense may be
committed only by "a human being who has been born 'and is alive."' 5 On
the other hand, if the offense proscribes activity by a "person," not only
natural persons, but also corporations or associations may commit it.36 Two
other terms reoccur frequently in specific code provisions, and typically are
used in defining aggravated offenses. A "deadly weapon" includes: any
"firearm"; "anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose
of inflicting death or serious bodily injury"; and "anything that in the man-
ner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily
Battle, In Search of the Adversary System-The Cooperative Practices of Private Crim-
inal Defense Attorneys, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 60 (1972).
29. See F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION To CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A
CRIME (1970).
30. Interview with Richard Denzer, in Drafting a New Penal Law for New York,
18 BUFFALO L. REV. 251, 258 (1969).
31. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP.
L. 532, 547 (1970).
32. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
33. LaFave, supra note 31, at 546.
34. See notes 175, 176 infra, and accompanying text.
35. TEX.PENAL CODE§ 1.07(a)(17).
36. Id. § 1.07(a)(27).
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injury. '' 37 "Serious bodily injury," in turn, is defined as "bodily injury that
creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bod-
ily member or organ."'38  Anyone using the Code should refer to section
1.07 when dealing with any of its specific provisions. Although that section
does not contain definitions of some key concepts that probably should have
been and no doubt will be added, it contains most of the definitions needed
to understand the new Code.
E. Burden of Proof (Chapter 2)
The constitutionally required burden on the prosecution to prove each ele-
ment of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt39 is stated at the outset of
chapter 2 in section 2.01. "Element of offense" is one of the terms defined
in section 1.07 and includes the forbidden conduct, the required culpability,
the required result, and the negation of any exception to the offense. The
traditional presumption of innocence and the fact that the arrest, confine-
ment, or indictment gives rise to no inference of guilt, standard elements
of the typical charge on reasonable doubt, also are stated in section 2.01.
The Code next classifies defensive matter into three categories for proce-
dural purposes: (1) exception; (2) defense; .and (3) affirmative defense.
An exception to an offense in the Code is a matter that must be negated
in the accusation and disproved in the state's case in chief. 40  The drafters
of the proposed revision suggest that this device, onerous to prosecutors, "is
to be used very sparingly and only after careful consideration of the nature
of the proof burden involved."'4 1  Their suggestion has been heeded. The
only example of an exception cited in the Committee Comments-a gift to
a public servant (prohibited by section 36.08) excepting a fee prescribed
by law-became a defense rather than an exception in the final draft of
the Code.42  When exculpatory matters are labelled defenses, the burden
of producing evidence is on the defendant, but the burden of persuasion be-
yond a reasonable doubt remains on the prosecution. 43 If a ground of de-
fense is not clearly labelled as falling within any of the three categories, it
is to be treated as a defense.44 Finally, some defensive matter falls within
the category of affirmative defenses which must not only be raised by the
defendant, but must be proven by him 'by a preponderance of the
evidence. 45  Although 'at first blush, the existence of affirmative defenses
seems to conflict with the reasonable doubt doctrine, they have been justi-
37. Id. § 1.07(a)(l1).
38. Id. § 1.07(a)(34). Mere "bodily injury" is "physical pain, illness, or any im-
pairment of physical condition." Id. § 1.07(a)(7).
39. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
40. TEX. PENAL CODE § 2.02.
41. PROPOSED DRAFr § 2.02, Comments at 21.
42. TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 36.08, 36.10.
43. ld. § 2.03(a)-(d).
44. Id. § 2.03(e). The burden of proof of defensive matters not specifically
treated in the Code could be shifted from the defendant to the prosecution, e.g., dis-
criminatory enforcement.
45. Id. § 2.04.
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fled with reference to some defensive matters because of convenience, and
because the defendant may have a greater opportunity to know the facts,
enabling him to feign a defense which will be difficult to disprove. 46
Finally, in section 2.05, the Code acknowledges the existence of rebut-
table presumptions for the prosecution drawn from both statutory and de-
cisional law. It states the generally accepted rule that once the prosecution
has proved the underlying fact or facts to which the presumption attaches,
the case must go to the jury, but the jury is not compelled, even in the ab-
sence of rebuttal evidence, to find the ultimate fact required for conviction.47
The judge is directed to charge the jury that before it can convict it must
find beyond a reasonable doubt the "fact or facts giving rise to the presump-
tion, the element to which the presumption applies, [and] any other element
of the offense charged."' 48 According to section 2.06, when a statute de,
clares that given facts constitute a prima facie case, rather than simply rais-
ing a presumption, a submission of the case to the jury is warranted when
those facts ,are proven. However, a proper charge apparently would not ex-
plicitly advise the jury that the prima facie case or presumption is created
by statute. 49
F. Multiple Prosecutions (Chapter 3)
The legislature declined the invitation to clarify the Texas law on multiple
prosecutions,5" and provided only for more liberal permissive joinder of of-
46. See LAFAVE & ScoTr 47-49. An example is the insanity defense. Placing the
burden of proof on the defendant to establish insanity has been held constitutional.
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). Requiring the defendant to prove alibi is un-
constitutional because the defense is simply a denial of the crime. State v. Smith, 454
F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1972); Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. de-
nied, 393 U.S. 1001 (1968). Restrictions on any defense that tends to negative the
existence of an essential element of the crime charged, either by placing the burden
of persuasion on the defendant (e.g., insanity) or not allowing him to raise it at all
(e.g., intoxication), arguably violates the due process requirement of proof beyond rea-
sonable doubt. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has eschewed establishing a consti-
tutional doctrine of mens rea. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535 (1968).
47. LAFAVE & ScoTr 51-52. Examples of case law presumptions are the presump-
tion from recent exclusive unexplained possession of stolen property that the possessor
stole it, and that intent to kill may be presumed from the intentional use of a deadly
weapon.
An example of a statutory presumption is contained in TEX. PENAL CODE § 31.06,
which consolidates and eliminates the archaic common law distinctions between the ac-
quisitive offenses. When a check is used to obtain property or services, the intent to
deprive the owner of property or to avoid payment for a service, requisite elements of
violations of id. §§ 31.03 and 31.04 respectively, are presumed if the issuer of the
check did not make the check good after receiving notice that payment was refused
because of insufficient funds, or if he had no account in the bank on which the check
was drawn. A similar presumption is created under the Class C misdemeanor offense
of issuance of a bad check in violation of id. § 32.41 in the Code chapter on fraud
offenses. In § 32.41 the presumption is of knowledge of insufficient available funds
for payment rather than the more serious intent to deprive, which makes the issuance
of a bad check a theft offense under chapter 31, potentially punishable by imprison-
ment.
48. TEX. PENAL CODE § 2.05(2)(D).
49. PROPOSED DRAFr § 2.05, Comments at 24-25.
50. See id. §§ 3.01-.06. One suspects that this chapter was drafted hastily in lieu
of the detailed proposal of the Bar Committee which, because of its emphasis on com-
pulsory joinder by the prosecution of related offenses, was not acceptable. One prob-
lem that could arise is whether the term "any one offense" also means lesser included
offenses under the new TEX. CoDE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.09 (Supp. 1974), adopted
as a conforming amendment to the Code.
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fenses against property as defined in title 7. The Code introduces the con-
cept of "criminal episode," the repeated commission of any one offense
against property,"' which is broader than the "same transaction" test of join-
der under present Texas Law.52  The effect is to allow a prosecutor to try
multiple counts of such offenses as burglary, theft, or vandalism that may
have been committed at different times and against different victims or prop-
erty in one prosecution. 53 The decision to join multiple counts in one pros-
ecution prevents adding charges of other instances of the same offense on
retrial of which probable guilt was known to the prosecutor when the first
prosecution commenced. 54 The sentences for the separate violations are
to run concurrently unless the defendant exercises his "right to severance
of the offenses" which, if granted, authorizes the judge in his discretion to
order consecutive sentences. 55 The coercive aspect of the possibility of con-
secutive sentences being assessed in the case of severance should discourage
most defendants from requesting it.56
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSIBILITY (TITLE 2)
Title 2 (chapters 6-9) contains the Code's treatment of the traditional
general principles of criminal responsibility. The basic elements of criminal
culpability are defined in chapter 6. Chapter 7 establishes the boundaries
of culpability of persons, both natural and legal, be they principal actors,
or those whose activity is only indirectly related to a criminal offense. Chap-
ters 8 and 9 define the excuses -and exemptions from criminal liability,
loosely referred to as "defenses."
A. Culpability (Chapter 6)
The first minimum requirement of criminal liability is expressed in section
6.01: "A person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in con-
duet, including an act, an omission, or possession, in violation of a statute
that provides that the conduct is an offense." The second requirement is
reflected in the Code's definition of "conduct" as "an act or omission and
its accompanying mental state."57  The Code thus restates the two basic
premises of criminal liability: actus reus, an act or omission, and mens rea,
guilty mind or culpable mental state. All offenses have, and are probably
constitutionally required to have, some form of act or omission coupled with
mental awareness,58 although the mental element required may not always
51. TEX. PENAL CODE § 3.01.
52. PROPosmn DRAFr § 3.01, Comments at 26. See generally Steele, The Doctrine
of Multiple Prosecutions in Texas, 22 Sw. L.J. 567 (1968).
53. TEx. PENAL CODE § 3.02(a). If there is more than one indictment, the prose-
cutor is required to give at least 30 days written notice prior to trial. Id. § 3.02(b).
54. Id. § 3.02(c).
55. Id. § 3.03-.04.
56. Comments of George Gilkerson, Seminar on Texas Penal Code, Texas Tech
University School of Law, Oct. 13, 1973.
57. TEx. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(8) (emphasis added).
58. LAFAvE & SCOTr 144-46, discussing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968),
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), and Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225
(1957).
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conform to the Code's "culpable mental state." In addition, some offenses
may require other elements that may be roughly grouped as circumstances,
result, and causation, which consists of concurrence of conduct and result.
The Actus Reus: Act or Omission. By limiting the concept of conduct
which may be proscribed as criminal to acts, including possession, or omis-
sions, the Code states a basic premise of criminal liability. The criminal
law cannot punish bad thoughts alone or personal condition and status.59
Only objective manifestations of criminality that either cause harm or are
in themselves proscribed as harmful may be made criminal.
The term "act" is defined in the Code to include "bodily movement,
whether voluntary or involuntary, and includes speech." 60  Omission on the
other hand is a "failure to act."61  Possession is "actual care, custody, con-
trol or management. ' 62 All may 'be criminal if they are voluntarily engaged
in.63 What "voluntary" means in this context is not defined, but presumably
it means willed or done consciously and as the result of determination or
effort. 64
Care should 'be taken not to confuse the "voluntariness" requirement with
the mental state described in sections 6.02 and 6.03, which is required for
specific offenses, nor to interpret it too 'literally, particularly with respect to
liability based on omissions. In the case of "'act," the concept of voluntari-
ness is probably descriptive, ,accurate and subject to a slight possibility of
confusion. Although it does not enumerate them, the Code should be inter-
preted to exclude reflex or convulsive movements, activity during uncon-
sciousness or sleep, and movements that otherwise are not a product of the
effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual.65
Of course, a voluntary act prior to the unwilled movement could be suffi-
cient for liability. For example, criminal liability could be based on an
epileptic's decision to drive an automobile, if not on his movements behind
the wheel during a blackout, when his auto strikes and injures a pedestrian.
The Code also requires that possession be "willed" before it may be con-
sidered conduct subject to liability. The possessor must either knowingly
obtain or receive the thing, or be "aware of his control of the thing for a
sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control," before he can be
said to have voluntarily possessed it. 6  The requirement of voluntariness
relates only to possession of the thing. The relevance of his awareness of
the nature of the thing is to be determined by reference to the specific pos-
sessory offense charged and its requisite culpable mental state.
59. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), indicating that a non-willed
status could not be constitutionally made criminal.
60. TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(1).
61. Id. § 1.07(a)(23).
62. Id. § 1.07(a)(28).
63. Id. § 6.01(a).
64. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2) (d) and Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955).
65. See id. §2.01 and Comments. The so-called defense of automatism is a con-
tention that the prosecution cannot establish proof of a voluntary act. It has been rec-
ognized in Texas. Bradley v. State, 277 S.W. 147 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925) (somnam-
bulism called "a species of insanity").
66. TEX. PEN. CODE § 6.01(b).
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Conceptually, criminal liability based on omissions or failure to act has
always been more troublesome than liability for affirmative action. An
omission on its face is completely neutral and cannot in itself, like an act,
raise any inference that it was willed. Furthermore, the determination
whether an omission is voluntary tends to turn on consideration of the same
facts that are relevant to the existence of the requisite mens rea.
An omission cannot subject one to liability under the Code unless a stat-
ute specifically provides that a failure to act is an offense or that one has
the affirmative duty to perform an act.6 7 By requiring that criminal liability
for failure to act 'be based on a statutory obligation, the Code appears to
have eliminated much of the uncertainty created by the tendency of the
common law to expand criminal liability, particularly with reference to homi-
cide, to include breaches of duties of a rather tenuous nature.6 In addition,
the limitation to statutorily-imposed duties conforms to the principle of legal-
ity that conduct should not be criminal unless forbidden by a law giving
advance warning that the conduct is criminal. The duty violated may be
imposed by the criminal statute defining an offense, for example, criminal
nonsupport of a child,60 or by 'a non-criminal statute, such as section 4.02
of the Family Code 70 which imposes a duty of support on a spouse or par-
ent.71 Since the term "statute" is not defined in section 6.01, the question
could arise whether -a duty to act -under this section may be imposed by
an ordinance or an administrative regulation or order. In light of the leg-
islative intent expressed in the preemption provision of section 1.08, only
those statutes passed by the state legislature would seem to be included.
Arguably, the drafters should have included a provision that no criminal
liability should attach for failure to perform an act if the person was physi-
cally inoapable of acting. Clearly, making it an offense not to do the im-
possible would be unconstitutional. However, the cases of real and com-
plete impossibility are rare, such as a quadriplegic parent who sees an in-
fant child drowning but cannot render assistance. The parent could not be
said to have willed her inaction even if she wanted the child to die. But
most cases would not be so clear-cut: for example, the poverty-stricken par-
ent who cannot give aid to a child but possibly could have obtained it else-
where, or the parent who might have saved his drowning child, but also
could have drowned in the attempt."2 In the cases where it is unclear
whether the person failing to act did so voluntarily, the dispute may merge
into the question of whether the person had the requisite mens rea of the
specific offense charged.78
67. Id. § 6.01(c).
68. See LAFAVE & Scor 182-87, including duties based on contract, voluntary as-
sumption of care and creation of peril.
69. TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.05.
70. TFx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.02 (Supp. 1974).
71. PROPOSED DRAFr § 6.03, Comments at 39.
72. The discussion to the end of this section is based on material in LAFAvE &
ScoTr 187-89.
73. Analytically, the issues of voluntariness of the omission and existence of the
required culpable mental state are distinct, but in a given case, proof of voluntary dis-
regard of a duty would also establish intent as to the result.
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A harder question may be posed by omissions of a defendant who has
a statutory duty to act, but who is unaware of either the existence or scope
of his duty to act, or knowing of the duty, is unaware of the facts giving
rise to it. In either case, the non-acting defendant's argument that his omis-
sion was thus involuntary will be akin to an ignorance or mistake of fact
defense. The United States Supreme Court has held in Lambert v. Cali-
fornia that due process is violated by imposing criminal liability for failure
to perform 'an act when "circumstances which might move one to inquire
as to the necessity of [acting] are completely lacking,"74 in other words,
a reasonable man would not have known of the existence of the duty to
act. It has been suggested that the Lambert defense "would most likely
not be available when the legal duty is consistent with a strong moral
duty."' 75 Treating ignorance as no excuse may be justified in situations in
which the reasonable man would know of the duty to act, thereby placing
the burden on the defendant to raise a reasonable doubt that he did not
know. In effect the prosecution is allowed the benefit of an inference that
the duty was so common that any person would have known of it. The
question of the voluntariness of an omission might arise when the defend-
ant acknowledges he knows of the duty, but claims he did not will his failure
to act. For example, assume a mother became intoxicated and as a result
of the alcohol-induced stupor was unaware that her child was smothering
to death. In a prosecution for intentional homicide, the issue of whether
her failure to prevent the smothering was voluntary might become indistin-
guishable in fact from the question of her intent. But assume that intent
in the sense of purpose was not found, or that she was charged initially with
criminally negligent homicide. She could 'argue that even if she were negli-
gent, her omission to act was not willed. This could hardly be disputed
since her act of drinking in itself, though willed, could hardly make her in-
attention to the fact of smothering willed.70 The prosecution could argue
that this case is 'analogous to that of an epileptic. However, if the prosecu-
tion relies on the voluntary act of drinking, it still must prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the drinking was done with the requisite mental state,
and was the legal cause of the death. If the offense charged was criminally
negligent homicide, proof would have to be shown by evidence of the de-
fendant's knowledge of past effects of 'alcohol, and that she should have con-
sidered the fact that the child might smother or otherwise meet death when
she drank.
The effect of the requirement of volition is that a movement must be
willed, whereas an omission or non-movement at a minimum must be ac-
companied by proof that the 'actor had knowledge of a duty to act or of
the facts giving rise to it.
Mens Rea: Culpable Mental States. The doctrine expressed in the maxim
74. 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957).
75. LAFAvE & Sco'rr 188.
76. But total inattention to a result is different than the question of voluntariness




actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act does not make one guilty
unless his mind is guilty), if not always adhered to, has consistently been
paid lip-service in Anglo-American law.77  The notion that conduct, to be
criminal, must be accompanied by an "evil-meaning mind," or an awareness
of wrongdoing, developed in the common law as a prerequisite of serious
offenses, and underlay the creation of new defenses based on -the absence
thereof. The historical emphasis of the criminal law on the state of mind
of the offender, expressed in the mens rea doctrine, has crystallized into
basic gradations of now widely-accepted culpable mental states. These
culpable mental states are now adopted in the Code to replace the "welter
of ambiguous and sometimes contradictory terms ' 78 (67 different ones by
actual count) used in the prior law to define the requisite mens rea for var-
ious offenses. The mental states, in descending order, are intentional, know-
ing, reckless, and criminally negligent, -with proof of the higher necessarily
including the lower degree of culpability.7 9 Although labelled a culpable
mental state, criminal negligence is really the absence of a mental state (in-
advertence) and when made an adequate degree of culpability, it results
in a form of objective, -as opposed to subjective, liability. As a result, liabil-
ity based on criminal negligence is, like liability without fault, not to be read
into a statute, but must be expressly provided as a sufficient degree of cul-
pability. If the statute does not specify any particular mental state and does
not "plainly dispense with 'any mental element," the actor must be at least
reckless to be held in violation of the statute.80
According to section 6.03, a person acts intentionally when his "conscious
objective or desire" is to cause the result or to engage in conduct proscribed
by the statute defining the offense. He acts knowingly with respect to a
described result when he is "aware" that it is "reasonably certain" his con-
duct will cause the result; he acts knowingly with respect to particular con-
duct or circumstances, when he is "aware" that his conduct is of such a na-
ture or that the circumstances exist.8 ' A person acts recklessly 'when he
"consciously disregards" a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a proscribed
result will occur or that a circumstance described iby a criminal statute ex-
ists,8 2 but acts with criminal negligence if he only "ought to be aware of"
77. See Dubin, supra note 23.
78. PROPOSED DRAFT § 6.05, Comments at 41. The four categories of culpable
mental states originated in the Model Penal Code. Cohen, supra note 23, at 419 n.17.
79. TEx. PENAL CODE §§ 6.02(d), (e).
80. Id. §§ 6.02(b), (c). Negligence is an "exceptional basis" of criminal liability.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comments at 127 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); see PRO-
sosEl DRAFT § 6.04, Comments at 40.
81. TEx. PENAL CODE § 6.03(b). Note that the culpable mental states are defined
with reference to the conduct itself, the results of the conduct, and the circumstances
surrounding it. This is because numerous offenses may have a different minimum de-
gree of culpability as to each. For example, to be guilty of the offense of indecent
exposure (id. § 21.08), the defendant must voluntarily (see id. § 6.01, and discussion
at text accompanying notes 60-65 supra) expose his anus or genitals with intent to
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of another and be reckless concerning whether an-
other is present who will be offended or alarmed. Interestingly, this definition appar-
ently has moved some ingenuous club proprietors to give advance warning to patrons
that entertainment in the club will involve nudity, for the purpose of negating the reck-
lessness required for criminal liability.
82. TEx. PENAL CODE § 6.03(c).
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that risk. 83 In neither case will the mental culpability of recklessness or
criminal negligence be satisfied unless the disregard or unawareness of the
risk constitutes a "gross deviation from the standard of care that -an ordinary
person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint. 8 4
In many situations, little reason exists to distinguish between a man who
engages in conduct purposefully and the one who engages in the same con-
duct "not on purpose but knowing that he is doing so.''s5 But in some cases,
it is appropriate that the distinction be made. The man who fires wildly
into a crowded passenger aircraft may not consciously desire that anyone
die, but obviously contemplates or -anticipates death of one or more passen-
gers as a result. The difference is between a person who wills a particular
act or result, and one who is merely aware of his act and "reasonably cer-
tain" of the result. "Reasonably certain," though not defined in the Code,
is not markedly different from the "practically certain" of the Model Penal
Code and the proposed Texas revision. 86 Both imply a high degree of prob-
ability and no substantial doubt.
"Recklessness" resembles "knowingly," since *a state of awareness is in-
volved in both. But the awareness of recklessness is of risk, rather than
of a high degree of probability; the matter is contingent from -the actor's
point of view.8 7 The risk involved in recklessness and criminal negligence
cannot be measured in terms of probability that harm will occur. Whether
a risk is "substantial" and "unjustifiable" would depend on the following
equation: the probability of injury and the gravity of the potential harm,
balanced against the desirability of the conduct, and in the case of a possible
beneficial result, the availability of less dangerous alternatives.88 In the case
of serious possible harm, a slight chance that it would occur would be an
unjustifiable risk if the social utility of the conduct were nil, such as firing
a gun in the air for ,amusement. However, if probability of injury is great,
for example in a dangerous life-saving operation, an unreasonable or unjusti-
fiable risk is not created by the surgeon who, because of the lack of any
feasible alternative, conducts the operation.
Finally, since the culpability of the actor's disregard of risk in reckless-
ness and the inadvertence to risk involved in criminal negligence are to be
measured according to the standard of an "ordinary person" from the
"actor's standpoint,"89 the facts known or the degree of risk perceived
by the allegedly reckless actor, or of which the reasonably prudent man
would have been aware in the circumstances of the allegedly negligent actor,
83. Id. § 6.03(d).
84. Id. H9 6.03(c), (d).
85. Weinreb, Comment on Basis of Criminal Liability, in 1 WoRInNo PAPERS OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS (1970), reprinted
in part in Dix & SHARLOT 443.
86. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962); PRo-
POsED DRAFr § 6.05(b).
87. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comments at 125 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955);
PROPOSED DRAFr § 6.05, Comments at 42-43.
88. See LAFAVE & ScoTT 210-11; PROPOSED DRAFr § 6.05, Comments at 43-44.
89. Tax. PENAL CODE §§ 6.03(c), (d).
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should be relevant. The trier of fact must make an evaluative judgment
whether the actor's failure of perception constituted a gross deviation from
acceptable standards of conduct. A jury might conclude that even if the
defendant was conscious of risk, he was not aware of the true nature and
extent of the risk, or that he had what he thought were good reasons for
his disregard of it. Hence, his conduct may not be reckless, but his failure
of perception could amount to criminal negligence.
The differences in culpable mental states may best be illustrated by an
example. Assume that a defendant strikes a pregnant woman in the ab-
domen and as a result the baby dies shortly after birth. In a homicide pros-
ecution, the evidence might show any of the following:
(1) if he struck the woman knowing she was pregnant and for the pur-
pose of killing the child, his conduct was intentional;
(2) if he knew she was pregnant and that his blows were likely to
cause the death, his conduct was knowing, even if his only purpose
was to cause her pain;
(3) if he knew she was pregnant and knew that death of the baby
might result, but he did not care, he was only reckless;
(4) if he knew she was pregnant but did not think his blow was hard
enough to hurt the baby, or he did not advert to the fact that she
was pregnant although it was plainly observable, he acted with
criminal negligence; or
(5) if he did not know she was pregnant and to the ordinary observer
she did not look pregnant, he did not have any culpable mental
state, at least with respect to the baby's death as a result.
A number of offenses in the Code contain no express requirement of mens
rea, most notably the offenses involving sexual misconduct. In some of
these offenses the intention or knowledge is manifested by the nature of the
conduct proscribed. Others appear necessarily to involve a culpable mental
state. For example, to be guilty of homosexual conduct a person need only
engage in "deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same
sex." 90 Proof of the requirement of volition would appear to be identical to
that of the minimum culpable mental state of intention to engage in the pro-
hibited conduct. The defendant would be adequately protected by the "de-
fenses" establishing absence of volition.91
A problem may arise when a culpable mental state must 'be read into
a statute in those rare instances in which one is neither specified, implied,
nor expressly excluded. The Code states the actor must be at least reckless
in those instances, 92 but does not state whether that culpable mental state
must be applied to all elements of the offense. For example, a person com-
mits a Class B misdemeanor "if he contrives, prepares, sets up, proposes,
operates, promotes, or participates in an endless chain." 8  Apparently, he
would have to be reckless as to whether his conduct amounted to participa-
90. Id. § 21.06.
91. See note 65 supra, and note 140 infra, and accompanying text.
92. TEx. PENAL CODE §§ 6.02(b), (c).
93. Id. § 32.48.
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tion or promotion and whether what he was participating or promoting was
an endless chain.
Concurrence of Conduct and Result: Causation. Perhaps the best evidence
that legislative draftsmanship may not be even theoretically adequate to the
task of covering the unusual problems of causation is the absence in many
penal codes of an explanatory statutory formula of causal relation.94 None-
theless, the Code, possibly on the theory that any provision is better than
none at all, attempts to set forth a formula which, if not pure enough to
handle all cases, should be at least adequate in most situations. Under sec-
tion 6.04 a defendant's conduct is considered a cause of a required result
if that result would not have occurred "but for" his conduct, operating either
alone or concurrently with another cause, unless "the concurrent cause was
clearly sufficient" and the defendant's conduct was "clearly insufficient" to
produce the result.95 To handle the situation in which the result comes
about in a manner or by a means not desired, contemplated, or risked by
the actor, the Code adds that the actor is still responsible as a cause "if
the only difference" in "what actually occurred" was that "a different of-
fense was committed" or "a different person or property was injured,
harmed, or otherwise affected."9 6
The typical case may be handled by the first clause of section 6.04 which
states the familiar "but for" test of causation-that defendant's conduct is
a cause of a result if the result would not have happened the way it did
without defendant's conduct. In other words, his conduct is a necessary con-
dition in order for the result to occur. However, when the defendant claims
that, because of other causes in the chain of events preceding the result,
it would have occurred in the same or substantially similar fashion regard-
less of his individual conduct, the problem of concurrent cause (a favorite
of criminal law theoreticians) is raised. In this vein, care should be taken
to realize that problems in this area are exaggerated by examples that deal
with given facts. In many cases, the causation problem merely reduces to
evidentiary and proof considerations.97
To handle the problem of concurrent cause, the Code adopts "sufficient"
cause as a basic concept in lieu of "proximate cause" and all that term im-
plies. The sufficient cause notion, like that of proximate cause, apparently
owes its genesis to tort law. 5  The sufficient cause formula is relevant in
three types of situations: (1) when the defendant's conduct would have
94. See, e.g., PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 1-2A2 (1972): "Conduct is
a cause of a result when it is an antecedent but for which the result would not have
occurred. This provision is not exclusive."
95. TEx. PENAL CODE § 6.04(a).
96. Id.
97. Carpenter, Concurrent Causation, 83 U. PA. L. Rnv. 941, 952 (1935); see, e.g.,
Duque v. State, 56 Tex. Crim. 214, 119 S.W. 687 (1909).
98. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 432 (1934). The combination "but for" (sine
qua non or necessary condition) and "sufficient cause" test of the Code resembles the
Restatement test. Sufficient cause may be analogized to the "substantial factor" test
of tort law. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL L.Aw 695-96 (2d ed. 1969). It also may be
characterized as an "efficient" or "substantially effective" cause. See J. HALL, GEN-
ERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 282-83 (2d ed. 1960).
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caused the result notwithstanding the other causes; (2) when the defendant's
cause, or the other cause or causes, were not sufficient in themselves, but
when combined they produced the result; or (3) when either the defend-
ant's cause, or the other cause or causes, would have been enough individu-
ally to produce the result.
Situations two and three create hypothetical difficulties. Assume the de-
fendant non-fatally wounds X, and because of the wound, X is unable to
escape when his house is set on fire and dies. Defendant's conduct is clearly
a "but for" or necessary cause of the death, but the death would not have
occurred .but for other causes for which he cannot be considered responsible.
According to the Code's "sufficient cause" formula, defendant's conduct is
a cause unless the other causes were clearly sufficient (and we have as-
sumed -they were not), and defendant's act clearly insufficient (and they
are assumed not). Hence, he is liable as a cause. Stated differently, his
act was a material factor in causing the result.
The third situation "has been thought to present metaphysical diffi-
culties."99 Suppose X is dying from causes not attributable to the defendant
when the defendant shoots and kills him. Defendant's action is a cause
since he brought about the death when it happened; the other causes were
clearly not sufficient to bring about the death when it occurred and defend-
ant's act clearly was not insufficient. Assume now that A inflicts a mortal
wound on X, who has an hour to live, when B kills him instantaneously.
B has hastened X's death and would be a cause as seen in the previous
hypothetical, but what of A? Under the Code formula, A's act is a "but-
for" cause, since the death would not have happened as it did except for
his conduct, but it does not seem to meet the sufficient cause formula. B's
act was clearly sufficient in itself to cause death, since in fact, it did and
because "causing death" is normally thought of as hastening death and not
merely determining the manner of dying. A's act, however, although hypo-
thetically sufficient to cause death, was clearly insufficient to cause death
in the manner in which it occurred. Of course, if the position is taken that
we should view the situation hypothetically in terms of what would have
occurred, rather than what did in fact occur, A's act would be a cause. But
to be consistent analytically, even if it might offend our sense of justice, A
should not be held responsible for causing the death. A defendant's intent
to do something more serious than actually occurs cannot by itself make him
liable for a more serious offense. This, of course, would not relieve him
of potential liability for crimes such as attempted murder or aggravated as-
sault.
B. Complicity
In chapter 7 a person is made criminally liable as a party if the offense
is committed by his own conduct, or when committed by the conduct of an-
other, if: (1) he procures the commission of the offense by causing or aid-
ing it through "an innocent or nonresponsible person" with the "kind of culp-
99. R. PERKINS, supra note 98, at 689.
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ability required" for its commission; (2) "he solicits, encourages, directs,
aids, or attempts to aid" another in its commission "with the intent to pro-
mote or assist" its commission; (3) he fails to make a "reasonable effort
to prevent" its commission "with intent to promote or assist," having "a legal
duty to prevent" it; or (4) the offense is "committed in furtherance of the
unlawful purpose" of a conspiracy of which he is a member and it "should
have been anticipated as a result" of the conspiracy, whether he actually
intended it or not.100 The inclusion of conspiratorial liability for conduct
of a co-conspirator can be questioned. As with felony-murder, it has been
used in the past to ease the burden on the prosecution of establishing proof
of guilt, or as a kind of "back-up" theory of the case. But the requirement
that co-conspirator liability may attach only if the conspirator "should have
anticipated" the offense as a result of the conspiracy could prove as trouble-
some as the old "natural and probable consequence" test. Omission of such
a basis for liability and reliance instead on the regular complicity provisions
would still allow the state to catch the "big fish." It also would be more
consistent with the Code's purported reliance on determining the grade of
offense and subsequent punishment on the basis of actual culpability.' 0'
The Code excludes any defense to accomplice liability based on the fact
that the defendant was "legally incapable of committing the offense in an
individual capacity" or that the principal actor had been acquitted, not pros-
ecuted or convicted, or convicted of a different offense, or was immune from
prosecution. 0 2  This follows prior law. However, the Code does not in-
clude provisions relating to limitations on complicity that have been previ-
ously recognized. Perhaps, for example, it was felt obvious that offenses
that are so defined as to make participation by another inevitably incident
to their commission would be excluded (e.g., the "victim" of prostitution).
Also the Code does not provide the defense of voluntary renunciation of
criminal objective (as it does, curiously, with reference to the inchoate of-
fenses), and hence appears to leave it merely as "a factor considered by
prosecutors and grand juries in deciding whether to prosecute."' 0 3
C. Enterprise Liability: Corporations and Associations
At common law a corporate body could not be guilty of a crime, and
under prior Texas law corporate criminal liability was recognized "only to
a very limited extent.' 04 In subchapter B of chapter 7, the Code presents
statutory provisions for expanded corporation and association liability that
track the language of the State Bar Committee's proposed revision.
100. Tax. PENAL CODE § 7.02.
101. The criminal law has reflected a traditional tendency to inject treatment con-
siderations into the definition of substantive crimes. See Michael & Wechsler, A Ra-
tionale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701, 713-17, 722-23, 745 n.161(1937). The new codes, including that of Texas, have not purged the law of this tend-
ency, indicating that the criminal law is still heavily result-oriented.
102. TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.03.
103. PROPOsED DRAFr § 7.05, Comments at 55.
104. Id. § 7.22, Comments at 57. See generally Hamilton, Corporate Criminal Lia-
bility in Texas, 47 TExAs L. REV. 60 (1968).
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Section 7.22 provides that a corporation or association may be guilty of
a criminal offense if the proscribed conduct is "performed by an agent acting
in behalf of a corporation or association and within the scope of his office
or employment," and constitutes (1) an offense in the Penal Code to which
corporations or associations are made subject; (2) an offense defined "by
law other than this [the penal] code" which plainly indicates a legislative
purpose to impose enterprise liability; or (3) a "strict liability" offense out-
side the Code "unless a legislative purpose not to impose criminal responsi-
bility on corporations or associations plainly appears." However, a corpora-
tion or association' 05 may be guilty of a felony only if the felonious con-
duct is "authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly toler-
ated" by a "majority of the board of directors" or "high managerial agent"
acting within the scope of his office or employment, in behalf of the cor-
poration or association.
The provision imposing absolute or strict liability for some offenses has
the effect of limiting criminal liability without fault under Texas law to cor-
porations and associations. 06 This is reinforced by the provision of section
7.24 that "due diligence" of the high managerial agent having supervisory
responsibility over the subject matter of the offense, while applying generally
to offenses that may be committed by corporations, does not provide a de-
fense to strict liability offenses, or offenses in which the legislative purpose
expressed in the law defining the particular offense plainly excludes a mens
rea. Even with respect to those offenses in which the "due diligence" de-
fense is recognized, the corporation has the burden of proof, 0 7 because the
105. TEx. PENAL CODE § 7.22(b) ("Criminal Responsibility of Corporation or As-
sociation") reads:
A corporation is criminally responsible for a felony offense only if its
commission was authorized, requested, commanded, performed, or reck-
lessly tolerated by:(1) a majority of the board of directors acting in behalf of the cor-
poration or association; or(2) a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation or
association and within the scope of his office or employment.(Emphasis added.)
Since the phrase "corporation or association" is used in defining the conditions of
enterprise felony liability in clauses (1) and (2), the omission of the words "or associ-
ation" after "corporation" in the first line of subparagraph (b) appears inadvertent.
Furthermore, nowhere in the subchapter on corporations and associations is there an
indication of an intent to treat associations and corporations differently for purposes
of criminal liability.
106. In effect, the Code creates a presumption against liability without fault with
respect to offenses committed by individuals. See note 80 supra. The contrary pre-
sumption in favor of imposition of strict liability on corporations or associations in the
case of an ambiguous statute, created by TEx. PENAL CODE § 7.22(a) (3), has several
possible justifications. A greater willingness to impose strict liability on enterprises ex-ists because of a feeling that punishment for offenses without culpability may have
some deterrent impact on enterprises, i.e., might improve their performance, but not onindividuals. Furthermore, imposition of strict liability may be justified when the of-
fenses are not "true" crimes, but are really only "civil" or "public welfare" offenses,
conviction of which involves no moral stigma as with conventional crimes. Finally,
the requirement of proof of objective fault would make the sanction practically unen-
forceable. Hence, the law in effect creates an irrebutable presumption of fault when
the "dangerous" act is committed. Of course, the argument has been forcefully made
that the relatively minor punishment meted out to offending corporations, particularly
in cases of absolute liability crimes, have little effect on future conduct anyway. See
Hamilton, supra note 104, at 69.
107. TEx. PENAL CODE § 7.24(a).
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facts relating to diligence are peculiarly within the corporation's possession,
and the requirement to show affirmatively that the supervisory personnel
failed to exercise due diligence would place an unreasonable burden on the
prosecution.
The subchapter adds a provision making it clear that the criminal liability
or punishment of an individual is not affected by a claim that the conduct
was performed in behalf of the corporation or unincorporated association.10s
D. Defenses
Matters of exculpation and excuse of general applicability are collected
in chapter 8 (general defenses) and chapter 9 (justification). Although all
exculpatory matters on behalf of the accused are loosely referred to as de-
fenses, important differences between types of defensive matter exist that
suggest at least two, and possibly three, distinct categories. First is the class
of true defenses which either prevent (or reduce) liability notwithstanding
proof of all elements of the offense. Most notable in this group are the
justification defenses such as self-defense, necessity, and public duty, but
other examples are entrapment and duress. Secondly, there are the
so-called "defenses" which are really not defenses at all, but are nothing
more than direct attacks on the sufficiency of the prosecution's proof of one
or more of the essential elements of the offense. The most significant are
alibi, accident, mistake, and intoxication. Finally, a third category may be
stated somewhat more tentatively which includes in effect only one defense,
that of non-responsibility because of lack of mental capacity. 109 Generally
referred to by the misleading label of the "insanity" defense, this exception
to criminal liability is difficult to categorize because of its chameleon-like
quality.
The Lack of Mental Capacity Defenses: Insanity. The insanity defense
as treated in section 8.01 of the Code deserves more than passing comment.
It may be true that in proportion to the relatively small percentage of cases
in which it is formally involved, the defense receives an unwarranted amount
of attention. The suspicion has even been expressed that all the verbiage
and controversy concerning it may largely involve a question of seman-
tics."10 But the squabble over the proper test of lack of mental capacity
as a defense is much more than that and cannot be dismissed as simply a
harmless academic exercise. Much like the issue of capital punishment, the
108. Id. § 7.24(b).
109. Although immaturity ("Age Affecting Criminal Responsibility" in id. § 8.07)
is often labelled a defense, it is not so treated here because it actually is a conclusive
presumption, or rule of law, that a person younger than 15 cannot be criminally liable
for any offenses other than aggravated perjury if the child "bad sufficient discretion
to understand" the oath, or relating to traffic laws. Between the ages of 15 and 17,
a minor may be prosecuted in a criminal court if jurisdiction is waived by the juvenile
court. Id. § 8.07(b). In a sense, immaturity is like insanity because it too establishes
a class of persons who are not held liable for conduct that would be criminal if com-
mitted by another. The whole thrust of the insanity defense, however, is to establish
membership in that class because the legislature cannot, as with immaturity, define it
prospectively.
110. Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 735 (8th Cir. 1967).
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defense of insanity is highly visible to the public and involves questions fun-
damental to the criminal process. The danger is not that too much is said,
but that what is said will continue to divert our attention away from the
real issues involved and to obscure what actually occurs in its administra-
tion.
The Code makes insanity an affirmative defense. The defendant must
raise and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that "at the time of
the conduct charged . . . as a result of mental disease or defect [he] either
did not know that his conduct was wrong [or that he] was incapable of
conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law he allegedly
violated."'11  The term "mental disease or defect" is not defined, but "an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial
conduct" is expressly excluded. 112 The Code thus adopts a variation of the
widely accepted Model Penal Code formulation of the test of mental respon-
sibility. It combines the alternatives of impairment of cognitive capacity
emphasized in the M'Naghten formula of the prior Texas law, and impair-
ment of volitional capacity that is the basis of the irresistible impulse test.
Unlike the Model Penal Code test which requires only lack of substantial
capacity, the Texas Code formulation seems literally to require complete im-
pairment of either cognitive or volitional capacity."1
Section 8.01 continues the trend of Anglo-American law of treating the
insanity defense as a non sequitur exception to criminal liability. By histor-
ical accident, insanity as a separate defense arose out of attempts by com-
mon-law judges to state the law and procedures applicable to a case in which
the mens rea of a crime was claimed to be absent because of a delusion
or mistake resulting from a claimed mental disorder."14  This extension of
the traditional mistake of fact defense to cases of "insanity" resulted in the
evolution of a defense which, if successfully presented, results in a finding
of not guilty, but which in reality is nothing more than a device for identifi-
cation of a special group of persons whom the state may need to continue
to supervise."15 The person found to be "insane" at the time of his alleged
crime receives the only special verdict in criminal cases, not guilty by rea-
son of insanity. He is thus found "guilty," as it were, of being insane and
hence to be feared by society.
111. TEx. PENAL CODE § 8.01(a).
112. Id. § 8.02(b). This is the exclusion of the psychopathic personality. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.01(2), Comments at 160 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
113. One federal judge has said that "considering the complex nature of the human
machine and the myriad of motivations which bring about human conduct, it is (in
my opinion) nothing short of absurd for a court ever to demand, or hope to get credi-
ble proof on, the crime having been caused solely by 'such mental disease.'" Carter
v. United States, 325 F.2d 697, 708 n.4 (5th Cir. 1963) (Brown, J., dissenting). But
section 8.01 of the Code seems to do precisely that-establish that "mental disease or
defect" was the sole cause of his conduct, when it might be stated accurately that there
is no sole cause of anything. The Model Penal Code test, on which § 8.01 is based,
would require only substantial impairment. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comments at
158-59 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
114. Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process, TRIAL, Feb.-Mar. 1968, at 29,
discussing the famous M'Naghten case.
115. This is acknowledged in PROpOSED DRAFr § 8.01, Comment at 64, and criti-
cized in Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Dejense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J.
853, 864-68 (1963).
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If the only justification for the special treatment of insanity lies in its iden-
tification function, the defense is suspect. The defense, as formulated in
the Code and as presently administered, cannot hope to identify with any
precision or logic "those persons accused of crime who suffer from such a
grossly disordered mental condition that the criminal law is incapable of in-
fluencing their behavior.""' 6  First of all, the defense cannot be expected
to sort out all those in need of psychiatric treatment since defense counsel
will raise the defense in only a small minority of cases. Because it may
result in indeterminate commitment to a mental institution, it is normally
used by defense counsel only as a last-resort defense in serious cases, par-
ticularly those involving the possibility of the death penalty." 7 Furthermore,
a test of insanity of limited scope, as under section 8.01, will discourage not
only its use, but also its successful assertion. Secondly, since automatic com-
mitment on a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity verdict alone is
of doubtful constitutionality,"" and in any event is no longer permissible in
Texas, 19 the identification rationale of the defense makes little sense. Now,
cases in which the question of insanity is formally injected into the trial on
guilt or innocence must be treated similarly to those in which it is not, but
which might have given the state cause to question the post-trial sanity of
the defendant. It would be appropriate in any case in which the mental
stability of the defendant is put into question by the evidence at trial,
whether by the insanity defense or not, for the judge or the state to institute
commitment proceedings.' 20
Part of the reluctance to expand the definition of insanity is a lack of
confidence in the competence of a jury and perhaps even judges. The fear
is that the -trier of fact will be confused by psychiatric testimony or will ab-
dicate its function of deciding the facts by rubber stamping the experts' opin-
ions. Either fear is largely unfounded. 12
116. This is the class of individuals the Bar Committee sought to identify by use
of the insanity test. PRoPosED DRAFT § 8.01, Comment at 64.
117. See A. MATTHEWS, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 193 (1970).
Interestingly, many proponents of capital punishment also argue for limitation of the
defense of insanity. See President Nixon's Proposal on the Insanity Defense, 1 J. PSY-
CHIATRY & L. 297 (1973): "It is a defense to a prosecution under any federal statute
that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the state of mind
required as an element of the offense charged. Mental disease or defect does not oth-
erwise constitute a defense." Ironically, such a proposal, eliminating the insanity de-
fense, could well expand the opportunity for an effective defense based on mental dis-
order. See discussion of "diminished capacity" at text accompanying notes 122, 123
infra. See also Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REv.
514, 518 (1968).
118. Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); LAFAvE & Sco'rr 319-20.
119. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 2(d)(3) (Supp. 1974).
120. Since Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), the state cannot indefinitely
commit a mental incompetent under the guise of allowing him time to recover suffi-
ciently to assist in his defense. However, the prosecutor can, and does, institute civil
commitment proceedings in many .cases in lieu of a criminal trial. A. MATrHEWS, su-
pra note 117, at 162.
121. See generally R. SIMON, THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY (1967). In fact, the jurors
may need more evidence of the defendant's mental condition. Most persons, with little
or no knowledge of the psychology of human behavior, have great difficulty in trying
to arrive at a conceptual picture of a typically insane person. In the ordinary case,
there is little difference between deciding what in fact was the defendant's state of mind
by reasonable inferences from objective circumstances, and deciding what an ordinary
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Perhaps the most telling argument against an expanded defense based on
lack of mental capacity is the lack of knowledge concerning mentally disor-
dered individuals, and the absence of adequate facilities for their treatment.
Unfortunately, the insanity defense as now formulated and administered
may be in itself one of the most significant impediments to development of
adequate facilities. It is to be expected that, for the present at least, the
penal law of Texas and many other states will continue to accomplish iden-
tification and treatment of only the more seriously disabled mental defec-
tives.
Absence-of-Essential-Element Defenses. "Defenses" that constitute a direct
attack on the sufficiency of the state's evidence amount to a claim either
that the defendant did not commit the offense, or that the offense did not
occur. The classic example is that of alibi, which apparently is so obvious
that it is not even mentioned in the Code. Another so-called defense not
specially mentioned is that of accident. It too is available to the defend-
ant, since the prosecutor must prove as a minimum of criminal liability that
the act charged was voluntary, and in the case of offenses with a required
result, that it was caused by the defendant. The only limit on the alibi
and accident defenses is the strength of the prosecution's evidence. Several
other defenses of this class are specifically treated because of the legislative
decision to place definite limits on their availability.
Diminished Capacity (Section 19.06). Though not denominated a defense
in the Code nor included in the chapters relating to defenses, section 19.06
provides resourceful defense counsel with the potential for a new defense
in Texas murder and voluntary manslaughter prosecutions. In this limited
class of cases, section 19.06 makes admissible into evidence not only "all
relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and the previous re-
lationship existing between the accused and the deceased," but also those
facts "going to show the condition of the mind of the accused at the time
of the offense." Authority from other jurisdictions exists to support the ad-
missibility of evidence of abnormal mental condition in these cases, even in
the absence of a provision similar to section 19.06, and without the defense
of insanity being raised.122 The rationale is simply that psychiatric evidence
should be admissible when relevant to prove or disprove a requisite culpable
state of mind to the same extent as any other relevant evidence.' 23  This
seems eminently correct and consistent with the notion that evidence of men-
tal disease or disorder and its effect on the existence of mens rea has a direct
bearing on the moral blameworthiness or guilt of the actor, and his amena-
bility to criminal punishment. But the previous discussion of the "insanity"
defense should suggest a caveat. The Texas courts could hold, not without
person would have thought. But there is no such thing as a typical or average insane
person. Why else would jury researchers conclude that one of the most influential fac-
tors in an insanity juror's decision process is the "extent to which the defendant resem-
bled or failed to resemble someone whom the juror knew to be mentally ill"? Id. at
154.
122. Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228, 1239 (1968); Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa.
382, 292 A.2d 286 (1972).
123. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02, Comments at 193 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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case authority, 24 that the phrase relating to "condition of mind" in section
19.06 is to be treated merely as a rule of evidence relating to the insanity
issue, because to hold that the phrase has independent significance would
create a conflict between it and definition of the insanity defense found in
section 8.01. If the defense of diminished capacity were allowed, the de-
fendant could receive a straight verdict of not guilty of murder or voluntary
manslaughter if the trier of fact determined that evidence of his mental con-
dition raised a reasonable doubt whether he could entertain the "intent" or
"knowledge" necessary for those crimes. If evidence of mental condition
is admitted on the insanity defense, however, the defendant must shoulder
the burden of persuasion that his cognitive or volitional capacity was com-
pletely impaired; if -the insanity defense is successful, the defendant also is
acquitted but not completely, for he has now been labelled a likely candidate
for continued state supervision.
Hence, a dilemma is posed by a doctrine that is logically unassailable but
arguably fraught with practical difficulties, such as likelihood of confusing
the jury, encouragement of compromise verdicts, and inadequate protection
of the public. These difficulties are probably exaggerated, but they may
be felt compelling enough to warrant rejection of the diminished capacity
doctrine in Texas.
Mistake of Fact. In section 8.02, the Code -limits the mistakes of fact
that will negate culpability to those concerning which the actor has a "rea-
sonable belief." The Code thus roughly restates the prior law that denied
the defense in the case of a merely honest mistake and made it available
with respect only to those mistakes that did not result "from a want of
proper care. '12 5 In doing so, it does not follow the trend of modern law
nor the proposed revision.
The requirement that a mistake of fact be "reasonable" cannot be recon-
ciled with the culpable mental state requirement. For example, where a
defendant is charged with possession of marijuana, even negligent ignorance
of the character of the cigarettes should negate his knowledge in fact that
the substance was marijuana. However, literal application of section 8.02
to allow only a "reasonable" mistake as a defense would make his negligence
sufficient for criminal liability, contrary to the language and intent in the
definition of the specific offense.120
Section 8.02 should be interpreted as only supplementary to the general
principles of culpability, not exclusive. In cases in which a specific cul-
pable mental state is required, evidence of any mistake, whether reasonable
or not, should be allowed unless specifically limited by the statute defining
the particular offense. The basic requirement of the Code that an essential
element of any crime is the "forbidden conduct" which means the "act or
omission and its accompanying mental state" in the statute defining the of-
124. Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1228, 1235 (1968); see State v. Garrett, 391 S.W.2d 235
(Mo. 1965).
125. PRoPosED DRAFr § 8.02, Comments at 67.




fense, seems to require no less. Enumeration of a particular defense of rea-
sonable mistake of fact does not necessarily compel a conclusion that it was
intended to limit other defenses of a like character, but more logically evi-
dences an intent to establish a minimum defense that is applicable to crimes
generally. 127
This interpretation is supported by examination of subparagraph (b) of
section 8.02 which states that if the defendant successfully asserts the mis-
take of fact defense, "he may nevertheless be convicted of any lesser in-
cluded offense of which he would be guilty if the fact were as he believed."
If the mistake must be reasonable in all instances, this section is of little
utility. For example, a defendant charged with theft for having destroyed
127. Of course, notwithstanding his claim of honest, but possibly unreasonable mis-
take, a defendant may not be able to prove that he did not have the culpable mental
state. When a defense based on mistake is expressly included within the specific pro-
vision defining the offense, the maxim of interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, apparently would compel a conclusion that the particular defense mentioned
(and its limitations) impliedly excludes other exceptions to criminal liability based on
that ground. For example, the bigamy statute (TEx. PENAL CODE § 2501) expressly
provides a defense of reasonable belief of freedom in law to remarry. An honest, but
unreasonable, belief likely would be no defense. It is unclear, however, whether the
expressio unius notion would operate to make the general defense of mistake of fact
in id. § 8.02 exclusive, contrary to the interpretation urged in the text. The maxim
may not apply in this instance, but support for the conclusion that this section is ex-
clusive may be found in the legislative decision to reject the proposed draft's inclusion
of even unreasonable, but honest, mistakes as potential negations of a required culpable
mental state. See PROPOSED DRAFr § 8.02(a) and Comments at 67. Rejection of the
draft provision could be interpreted as a decision to continue the commitment of the
common law and the prior Texas law to a limited mistake of fact defense, which in
effect makes negligence the culpable mental state. Such an interpretation, however,
would be contrary to the purported objective of the Code to assess guilt on the basis
of actual culpability by defining offenses in terms of subjective culpable mental states.
A serious problem of interpretation could arise concerning the status of mistake as
a defense to sexual assaults against children, a subject causing considerable litigation.
See People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1964).
The problem arises because of the omission of any requisite culpable mental state for
the offense of Rape of Child (TEx. PENAL CODE § 21.09) or Sexual Contact with a
Child (id. § 21.11(a)(1)) and any specific inclusion or exclusion of a mistake of fact
defense in the Rape of Child definition or the Sexual Abuse of a Child (id. § 21.10)
and the Indecency with a Child (id. § 21.11) statutes. All these offenses provide a
defense when the alleged victim is a child 14 years or older who has previously en-
gaged promiscuously in sexual misconduct. Two of them, rape and sexual abuse of a
child, provide an affirmative defense if the victim was of the opposite sex and was two
years or less in age than the defendant. Nowhere is a defense based on mistake as
to age mentioned, unlike the proposed draft, which expressly provided a defense based
on reasonable mistake of age when criminality depended on the child's being younger
than 16, and expressly excluded it if criminality depended on the child's being younger
than 14. PROPOSED DRAFr § 21.12. The hiatus is aggravated by the failure to provide
any culpable mental state for the offenses of Rape of a Child (Tax. PENAL CODE §
21.09(a)) and Sexual Contact with a Child (id. § 21.11(a)(1)). Hence, it appears
that the minimum culpable mental state of recklessness must be read into those offenses
by virtue of id. §§ 6.02(b), (c), discussed at notes 92, 93 supra. Since the general
defense of mistake of fact afforded by § 8.02 is not excluded expressly, nor it seems
by implication, the defendant should be allowed to present evidence of reasonable mis-
take of age to establish that, if anything, he was only negligent concerning whether
the child was underage. Even in the case of those sexual assaults of children that ex-
pressly require a mental state (i.e., "intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person"), a strong argument could be made that the defense of reasonable mistake of
age is applicable. See People v. Hernandez, supra. However, a court might hold that
by its language, the general mistake of fact section applies only if it would negate "the
kind of culpability required for commission of the offense." Thus, since the offenses
require no mental state other than an "intent to gratify," evidence of mistake would
be irrelevant.
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another's property who successfully defends on the ground that he mistak-
enly and reasonably concluded that it was abandoned cannot be found guilty
even of negligent destruction of property (if there were such an offense)
since negligence implies unreasonableness on the part of the actor. On the
other hand, if his defense is unsuccessful, there is no need to resort to sub-
paragraph (b).
Mistake or Ignorance of Law. Where a person acts under a mistaken
belief that "the conduct charged did not constitute a crime," he is not re-
lieved of liability unless the belief was reasonable and based on "reasonable
reliance" on an "official statement of the law" or "an opinion" emanating
from a court of record or a public official charged "with responsibility for
interpreting the law.' 128  This narrowly circumscribed affirmative defense
constitutes an exception to the codification in section 8.03 of the established
common-law maxim that ignorance of law is no defense. 1
The ignorance or mistake referred to in section 8.03 relates to a purported
misinterpretation or misunderstanding of the existence or meaning of the
criminal law itself, not to the effect of some other non-criminal law. In
situations in which the defendant does not argue he was ignorant of the
criminal law or mistaken as to its meaning, but that his mistake instead re-
lated to the effect of a law other than that violated, in other words, a non-
criminal law, his defense should be treated as a mistake of fact. This is
the effect of section 25.01 relating to bigamy which provides a defense if
the actor "reasonably believed" that under the civil statutes his prior mar-
riage was void or had been dissolved.
Reliance on the advice of a lawyer is not specifically made an affirmative
defense. However, a defendant who relied on his lawyer's interpretation
of a case construing a statute or an attorney general's opinion presumably
might claim a defense on the ground that his conclusion based on such ad-
vice was one that a reasonable person would reach. However, the poten-
tial risk of fabrication of such a defense out of disingenuous legal advice,
or the fostering of dishonesty among attorneys apparently dissuaded its in-
clusion.
Intoxication. Section 8.04 restates the "peculiar" position of the former
Texas law on intoxication as a defense that has been referred to as "a per-
version of the common-law rule. 1 0 In effect, it is not a statement of a
defense, but rather of a non-defense, and is actually a rule of evidence. Un-
der it, voluntary intoxication "does not constitute a defense" and "evidence
of temporary insanity caused by intoxication" is admissible only in mitiga-
tion of punishment.' 3 ' Apparently, although not stated, the "temporary in-
sanity" caused by the "intoxication" resulting from "any substance," for ex-
ample, drugs, does not include the rare "involuntary intoxication" or stupor-
ous condition that is neither self-induced nor involuntary. Evidence of
such conditions should be admissible on the issue of whether the actor pos-
128. TEX. PENAL CODE § 8.03(b).
129. Id. § 8.03(a).
130. PRoPosED DRAFr § 8.03, Comments at 69.
131. Tax. PENAL CODE § 8.04.
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sessed the requisite culpable mental state of the offense (or was at the time
of his act, suffering from an incapacitating mental disease or defect). 132
The Code thus rejects the prevailing view that even voluntary intoxica-
tion is a defense to a crime requiring intent or knowledge if it negatives
the existence of those elements, but is immaterial to the existence of the
awareness of risk required when recklessness is sufficient for culpability. The
Code's departure from the prevailing view, though theoretically inconsistent
with the general principles of culpability, may be justified in light of prac-
tical reality. Considerable evidence exists that intoxication has less effect
on one's mental functions than is commonly believed, and in many cases
a defense counsel's decision to introduce evidence of intoxication may be
counterproductive."13
The True Defenses
Entrapment. The judge-made entrapment defense becomes a part of
Texas statutory law in section 8.06. To be available, the defendant must
allege and the prosecution must be unable to disprove that: (1) the defend-
ant committed the offense charged "because he was induced to do so by
a law enforcement agent," and that (2) the inducement of the agent con-
sisted of "persuasion or other means likely to cause persons to commit an
offense." Inducement amounting to entrapment is not established by law
enforcement activity that merely affords "an opportunity to commit an of-
fense."'13
4
The subject of a defense based on improper inducement by police to crim-
inal activity has been part of the wider debate over the proper role of the
police in investigation and detection of crime. The battle lines over entrap-
ment have formed around two separate theories of the defense. The so-
called "origin of intent" theory focuses on the subjective intent of the de-
fendant (the existence of criminal predisposition), while the "police
conduct" or objective theory of entrapment emphasizes the nature of the
methods used by the police. Proponents of the latter view, including the
drafters of the Model Penal Code, were dealt a blow by the United States
Supreme Court holding this past year in United States v. Russell, that the
"police conduct" theory of entrapment was not constitutionally required.
3
The analogy to the exclusionary rule or suppression of unlawfully-obtained
evidence doctrine used to support the objective test was rejected. 1 6  Of
132. See discussion of insanity and diminished capacity, notes 111-24 supra, and ac-
companying text.
133. See Dix & SHARLOT, notes and authorities at 552-55.
134. TEx. PENAL CODE § 8.06(a). The section applies to activity by personnel of
any federal, state and local law enforcement agency or any person acting pursuant to
their instructions. Id. § 8.06(b).
135. 411 U.S. 422 (1973).
136. Aside from questions of fairness, one objective of the entrapment defense is
to discourage official misconduct. It may have less impact in this regard than the ex-
clusionary rule. The reason is that methods raising the possibility of entrapment are
almost always confined to offenses that the police claim have no other effective alterna-
tives for detection and obtaining of convictions, primarily narcotics and sex offenses.
See Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L. REv. 871,
874 (1963). In fact, the defense presumably would not be available in prosecutions
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course, the Supreme Court's decision does not prevent any jurisdiction from
utilizing the police conduct test, which now appears to be law in Texas.
The new provision, like the origin-of-intent test, first requires evidence
that the defendant was in fact induced by the police to commit the crime.
But after that finding, the Texas formula asks whether the methods used
were "likely to cause persons to commit the offense. ' 17 It thus appears
that whether the means used by the police are sufficient to establish entrap-
ment depends on their probable effect on persons who normally would not
commit the crime, rather than on a determination whether the actor would
not have committed the crime had he not been so induced. 8 As a result,
the Code eliminates the danger to defendants in raising the entrapment de-
fense that the evidence of prior misconduct, admissible under the subjective
test on the issue of the criminal disposition, will be used to establish guilt
of the crime charged.
The real value to the defendant of the entrapment defense lies in its pro.
cedural consequences. Under the Code, it is a "defense," requiring the
prosecution to disprove its existence beyond a reasonable doubt.139 Since
section 8.06 does not speak to the issue of whether denial of the commission
of the offense and a claim of entrapment are inconsistent, the prior law that
a defendant must elect either one or the other presumably is unaffected. 40
Finally, one assumption underlying the police conduct theory is that the is-
sue will be decided initially as a matter of law by the judge, as in the case
of a hearing on a motion to suppress based on police misconduct. If the
judge decides the issue against the defendant, it is then to be submitted to
the jury. Section 8.06 is silent on this aspect of the defense. However,
in the conforming amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure, article
28.01, entrapment is included as a matter that the judge "shall" determine
at pretrial hearing. x4x
Duress. Section 8.05 provides that a person may not be convicted of a
felony if the criminal conduct was coerced by a threat of imminent death
or serious bodily injury to himself or another that "would render a person
of reasonable firmness incapable of resisting." The defense is more liberal
as to non-felony offenses, in which the compulsion that a person of reason-
for offenses involving bodily injury or the threat thereof. R. PERKINS, supra note 98,
at 1036. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). In such
cases, the encouraging officers probably would be held liable as co-conspirators or ac-
complices.
137. TEx. PENAL CODE § 8.06(a) (emphasis added).
138. This is expressly stated in PROPOSED DRAFr § 8.05(a) ("creating a substantial
risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it").
Although not expressly stated in the entrapment section as enacted, it appears that the
trier of fact must use the hypothetical construct of a normal person, i.e., one not oth-
erwise criminally disposed, as an objective standard against which to measure the in-
tensity of the officer's encouragement.
139. TEx. PENAL CODE § 8.06(a).
140. See PROPOSED DRAFr § 8.05, Comments at 73. However, since it is possible
that the defense will now be ruled on as a preliminary matter before trial, it would
seem more reasonable to allow it to be raised in the alternative.
141. Of course, the trial judge is not obliged to hold a pre-trial conference. Tax.
CODE CRIM. Pioc. ANN. art. 28.01, § 1 (Supp. 1974) ("the court may set any criminal
case for a pre-trial hearing").
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able firmness could not resist need only be "force or threat of force." An
affirmative defense, duress is not available if an actor either intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was prob-
able that he would be subjected to compulsion. Finally, the Code expressly
rejects the special rule of prior law of duress between spouses. 142
Justification Generally. Sections 9.21 and 9.22 contain the general de-
fense of justification that will exonerate a defendant from criminal liability
for conduct proscribed as specific offenses in the penal law. Unless incon-
sistent with other provisions of the subchapter, conduct that would otherwise
constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when it is "required or
authorized" by law or by judicial decree 148 or is justified by necessity, in
other words, reasonable belief that the conduct is immediately necessary to
avoid imminent harm.'44 The defense of necessity is limited to situations
in which the injury or evil to be avoided, according to "ordinary standards
of reasonableness" clearly outweighs "the harm sought to be prevented by
the law proscribing the conduct"' 45 and a legislative purpose to exclude the
claimed justification "does not otherwise plainly appear.' '146
Justification-Special Relationships. Subchapter F of chapter 9 delin-
eates specific situations in which the use of physical force on another per-
son may be justified. 47 A parent, teacher, or other person entrusted with
the care and supervision of a minor or incompetent may use physical force
when necessary to maintain discipline or to promote the welfare of -the child
or incompetent. The force is justified "when and to the degree the actor
reasonably believes is necessary" either for the purpose of discipline, or wel-
fare of the individual, and in the cases of institutional supervision, to main-
tain the institution's integrity.
Justification-Defense of a Person. Section 9.31 justifies the use of phys-
ical but non-deadly force when and to the extent that the actor "reasonably
believes" it is "immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's
use or attempted use of unlawful force.' 148 Deadly force may be employed
only when the actor reasonably believes it immediately necessary to protect
himself or a third person from the other's use or attempted use of unlawful
deadly force on himself or a third person, or to prevent "imminent commis-
sion of aggravated kidnapping, murder, rape, aggravated rape, robbery, or
aggravated robbery.' 149 Even then, such force may be used only if "a rea-
sonable person in the actor's situation would not have retreated."' 50
142. TEx. PENAL CODE § 8.05(e). Under the prior law, a wife committing a crime
by command of her husband was criminally liable for only half the punishment to
which he could be subjected. Ch. 3, art. 32, [1925] Penal Code of Texas 7 (repealed
1973).
143. Id. § 9.21(a).
144. Id. § 9.22(1).
145. Id. § 9.22(2).
146. Id. § 9.22(3).
147. Id. §§ 9.61 (Parent-Child), 9.62 (Educator-Student), 9.63 (Guardian-Incom-
petent).
148. Id. § 9.31(a).
149. Id. § 9.32(3).
150. Id. § 9.32(2).
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A defendant may not rely on this justification if he provokes another per-
son's use of unlawful force to provide himself with an excuse for causing
physical injury or death to that person. Nor will he be excused if he is
the initial aggressor, unless he "abandons the encounter, or clearly communi-
cates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he cannot safely
abandon" it, but "the other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlaw-
ful force against the actor."' 51  Physical force that was "consented to" by
the actor can never justify the response of physical force'1 2 unless, of course,
it was also consented to by the other party, nor can mere verbal provoca-
tion. 58 Finally, a person is not allowed to use any force to resist an ar-
rest, whether lawful or not, when made by "a peace officer," or by his agent
in the officer's presence, 54 unless the peace officer or his agent, not in re-
sponse to resistance, "uses or attempts to use greater force than nec-
essary."' 155
Finally, the use of non-deadly force is authorized "when and to the degree
[the actor] reasonably believes" it immediately necessary to frustrate an at-
tempt by another to commit suicide or inflict serious bodily injury on him-
self.' 56 Deadly force is even justified when reasonably believed to be "im-
mediately necessary to preserve the other's life in an emergency."' 15 7
Justification-Defense of Property. Section 9.41 provides: "A person in
lawful possession of land or tangible, movable property" may use such phys-
ical force as he reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate a
criminal trespass on, or interference with, such property. He may use
deadly force only when reasonably necessary to prevent a trespasser or po-
tential thief from committing arson, burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery,
or theft, or criminal mischief during the nighttime, or to prevent immediate
flight from a burglary, robbery, or theft offense with the property, and he
reasonably believes that the "land or property cannot be protected or recov-
ered by any other means" or that not to use the force "would expose the
actor or another to a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury."'5 s
A person is justified in using force against another to protect a third per-
son's property if he would be justified in using the force to protect his own
property, and he either reasonably believes the intrusion constitutes
"attempted or consummated theft" or "criminal mischief" or he has a legal
duty to protect the property, was requested by a third person to protect it,
or the third person is a family member.159 The justification provided in
the sections outlined above applies to the use of a protective device if it
151. Id. § 9.31(b)(4).
152. Id. § 9.31(b)(3).
153. Id. § 9.31(b)(1).
154. Id. § 9.31(b) (2). This is directly contrary to prior law. PROPOSED DRAFT
§ 9.31, Comments at 88. Denial of the privilege of self-help in response to unlawful
police conduct is consistent with the trend toward expansion of civil remedies against
the police. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
155. Tax. PENAL CODE § 9.31(c).
156. Id. § 9.34(a).
157. Id. § 9.34(b).
158. ld. § 9.42.
159. Id. § 9.43.
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is "not designed to cause, or known by the actor to create a substantial risk
of causing, death or serious bodily injury" and its use is "reasonable under
all the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be when he
installs the device."' 160
Justification-Law Enforcement. Under section 9.51 the use of force is
justified when and to the extent that the actor reasonably believes is immedi-
ately necessary to make an arrest or search which he "reasonably believes
to be lawful," or with a warrant that he "reasonably believes" to be valid.
Before so doing he must manifest his purpose and identify himself as a peace
officer, "unless he reasonably believes his purpose and identity are already
known by or cannot reasonably be made known to 'the person to be
arrested." 16  Resort to deadly physical force in addition to justifiable non-
deadly force by a peace officer, or a private person assisting him at his direc-
tion, is justifiable to effect an arrest or to prevent an escape, only when
he reasonably believes that the felony or offense against the public peace
for which the arrest is authorized included the use or attempted use
of deadly force, or that there is a "substantial risk that the person to be
arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury to the actor or another if
the arrest is delayed."'1 62 The Code thus rejects the limitations of the pro-
posed revision on the use of deadly force by private citizens, even those act-
ing at the direction of a peace officer. 168  However, the Code discourages
citizens' arrests by making the actor determine the legality of the supposed
law enforcement activity at his peril; an arrest must be lawful in fact and
in law before a private citizen is justified in using force to effect it. 64
Finally, the same degree of force to prevent "the escape of an arrested
person from custody" is justified if it would have 'been to effect the arrest
under which the prisoner is in custody, except that "a guard employed by
a penal institution or a peace officer" may use "any force, including deadly
force," that is believed, though not necessarily reasonably, "to be immedi-
ately necessary to prevent the escape."'1 65
III. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSES AND PUNISHMENT (TITLE 3,
CHAPTER 12)
The traditional felony-misdemeanor classification of criminal offenses is
retained in the Code.166 As in prior law, unless specifically designated as
such only those offenses that carry a potential term in a penitentiary are
felonies.' 67 All the offenses that are felonies in the new Code have a mini-
mum prison term of two years. All other offenses are misdemeanors. 68
160. Id. § 9.44.
161. Id. § 9.51(a).
162. Id. § 9.51(c).
163. PRoPosED DRAFT § 9.51(c).
164. TEx. PENAL CODE § 9.51(d).
165. Id. § 9.52. Note the absolute nature of this privilege, i.e., there is no qualifi-
cation that the belief be reasonable.
166. Id. § 12.02.
167. Id. § 1.07(a)(14).
168. ld. § 1.07(a)(21).
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Unlike the old Code, however, the new Code does not assign a specific pen-
alty in the definition of each offense which determines the grade of the of-
fense. Instead, it establishes a graded scheme of felony and misdemeanor
classifications--capital, first, second, and third degree felonies, and Class A,
B and C misdemeanors-into which each specific offense is placed.1 69  The
classification assigned to an offense operates to incorporate by reference the
authorized punishment designated in chapter 12 for the appropriate felony
or misdemeanor grade. In addition to the ordinary punishments for each
category of offense, the Code contains recidivist provisions which authorize
enhanced punishment for habitual or repeat offenders, both felony170 and
misdemeanor. 171 Also added is the authority to assess against corporations
fines based on gain. 172  The resulting punishment structure is set forth in
Appendix A.
The Code introduces two novel provisions into Texas sentencing law.
First, the trial court is authorized to reduce either the charge or a conviction
of a third degree felony to that of a Class A misdemeanor "if, after con-
sidering the gravity and circumstances of the felony committed and the his-
tory, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant," the judge finds
that such action "would best serve the ends of justice.' 73  Second, a de-
fendant at sentencing may, with consent of the prosecutor and the court,
admit all uncharged offenses other than those of a higher category than that
of which he stands convicted, and be sentenced thereon.174  Offenses outside
the venue of the sentencing court may not be admitted under this section
without the consent of the prosecuting attorney of the county having juris-
diction and venue. Any admitted offense taken into account by the court
under this provision cannot later be prosecuted.
The new sentence structure, although still relying primarily on the pen-
alties of fine and imprisonment, seeks to make sentences more rational and
to expedite the disposition of offenders. Aside from making the definition
of crimes shorter, the prospective designation of authorized punishment by
category may help prevent disproportionate sentences between like offenses,
by allowing observation of offenses as a group according to category. A
complete grouping of offenses by penalty classification is presented in Ap-
pendix B. The neat division accomplished by the classification of offenses
and gradation of punishments cannot be expected to be a panacea for all
the sentencing problems confronting the criminal law. The legislative de-
cision to offer a wide range of possible dispositions of convicted offenders
is based on the premise that the goal of individualized treatment is thereby
enhanced. Unfortunately, the establishment of this flexible sentencing struc-
ture is only a first step that seems doomed to failure, part of which may
be inevitable since the goal of "individualized treatment" may be only partly
169. Id. §§ 12.03, 12.04.
170. id. § 12.42.
171. Id. § 12.43.
172. Id. § 12.51(c). Corporations also are subject to larger fines generally than
individuals. Id. § 12.51(b).
173. Id. § 12.44.
174. Id. § 12.45.
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achievable, given the limits on our present knowledge of what motivates
human behavior and on our capability to fashion programs designed to re-
habilitate the individual offender. 175 But to the extent that the goal of in-
dividualized treatment is theoretically attainable, the omission from the Code
of several proposals relating to the exercise of sentencing discretion by the
trial judge raises doubts about its being achieved in fact. 176  A judge need
not utilize a presentence report nor state his reasons for imposing a sentence.
No standards are provided to guide the sentencing decision nor is appellate
review of sentences authorized.
The punishments available under the new Code are substantially more
severe than those proposed by the State Bar Committee on Revision. 77 No
doubt this was at least partly in response to the belief that community senti-
ment, expressed in the "law and order" battle cry, is in favor of additional
behavior being declared criminal and more severe penalties. 178 The effec-
tiveness of long prison terms in affecting the incidence of crime can be ques-
tioned, particularly for first offenders. On the whole, increasing the severity
of sentences does not substantially increase the amount of time served, but
it does ,tend to promote delay, which may have the corresponding effect of
diminishing the rehabilitative impact of the ultimate sentence imposed. 79
A final comment should be made concerning the decision of the legislature
to reinstitute capital punishment in certain cases of aggravated murder. The
death penalty provisions,' 8 0 like those concerning drugs, were not submitted
to the legislature as part of the Penal Code package, undoubtedly for fear
of placing the Code in jeopardy. One cannot resist the temptation to con-
clude that political expediency was a major factor in the decision to rein-
stitute capital punishment, even in the face of doubts concerning its consti-
tutional validity.' 8 ' The provision clearly seems inadequate to overcome
the constitutional objections of the United States Supreme Court to the pro-
cedures by which the decision to impose the death penalty is made. After
175. Brancale, Diagnostic Techniques in Aid of Sentencing, 23 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 442, 456-60 (1958). See also Cohen, supra note 23, at 416-17; Motley, "Law
and Order" and the Criminal Justice System, 64 CiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 259, 265(1973). Judge Motley goes so far as to say that the present system is a failure and
advocates instead a system of mandatory sentences of shorter duration. Id. at 266-69.
176. See Motley, supra note 173; Rubin, Allocation of Authority in the Sentencing-
Correction Decision, 45 TEXAS L. REV. 455, 465-69 (1967). In addition to the omis-
sions noted in the text, the Code does not contain any provision purporting to regulate
the trial court's discretion to impose either consecutive or concurrent sentences for mul-
tiple offenses, as was proposed. PRoPosED DRAFT § 12.45.
177. Compare Appendix A infra, with Appendix B to PROPosED DiRAFr at 495-96.
178. See Cohen, supra note 23, at 415-17; Schwartz, Introduction to Symposium:
New York's New Penal Law, 18 BuFFALo L. REv. 211-12 (1969).
179. Dix & SHARLOT 68. However, when delay is eliminated by the plea bargaining
process, the "playing of numbers" therein may, in many instances, have an undesirable
effect on the convicted offender's attitude. He may think he has beaten the "system,"
or has been manipulated and treated unfairly. Clearly, severe sentences encourage the
"numbers" game. Also, one cannot help but wonder what real effect more severe sen-
tences will have on the time actually served. See id. at 69-70; TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 42.12(C), § 15(a) (Supp. 1974) (prisoner may be paroled after serving one-
third of his sentence or 20 years, whichever is less).
180. TEx. PENAL CODE §§ 12.31, 19.01, .03; TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071 (Supp. 1974).
181. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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a finding of aggravated or capital murder, three issues are submitted to the
jury, which must be answered "yes" unanimously before a verdict of death
is possible.' 82 Two of the issues relate to the state of mind of the defend-
ant and the reasonableness of his actions at the time of the killing, issues
which add little, since presumably they must .be answered affirmatively on
the question of guilt.' 8  The third question is "whether there is a probability
that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would con-
stitute a continuing threat to society." 84  This vague standard presents ob-
liquely what apparently was the unstated test, or part of it, under the prior
unconstitutional law: whether the convicted murderer could be rehabil-
itated, or whether he was incorrigible, in other words, is society justified in
"giving up" and eliminating him?8 5
IV. INCHOATE OFFENSES
Title 4 of the Code undertakes for the first time in Texas history to treat
systematically four separate "inchoate" offenses-attempt, conspiracy, solici-
tation, and criminal instruments-all of which involve uncompleted criminal
activity in the sense that they are punishable even if their ultimate objec-
tive is not achieved. The fact that an actor's criminal purpose is not
achieved does not detract from either his culpability or his demonstrated
danger to society, and hence he may 'be punished severely-one grade below
that of the completed offense.' 86 Possession of criminal instruments, how-
ever, is always a third degree felony.18 7  The inchoate offenses serve sev-
eral purposes, not the least of which is to allow early intervention by law
enforcement officials into criminal activity for the protection of the public.
However, they pose the special danger of casting too broad a net, and must
be defined carefully to protect the innocent.
A. Attempt
In section 15.01 of the Code Texas for the first time has a general attempt
182. TEx. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Supp. 1974).
183. Id. arts. 31.071(b)(1), (3). Question (1) asks whether the conduct causing
death was committed "deliberately" and with "reasonable expectation" of death, and
question (3) inquires whether it was "unreasonable in response to the provocation, if
any." To find the defendant guilty of murder, the trier of fact must determine that
the defendant contemplated or expected death to result and that he acted unreasonably.
See discussion of murder in text accompanying notes 212-15 infra.
184, TEx. CODE CRUM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (2) (Supp. 1974).
185. Apparently, then, the jury has no more, and probably less guidance than it had
under the prior law. Even if it were possible to enact a death penalty provision that
would pass constitutional muster, Texas has not yet done so. Comments of Frank Ma-
loney, Chairman, Section on Criminal Law, State Bar of Texas, Seminar on the Texas
Penal Code, Texas Tech University School of Law, Oct. 13, 1973. Also, it should be
noted that the hypothetically mandatory death penalty of the Code does not eliminate
prosecutor discretion in charging non-capital murder, nor the jury's power to find a
lower grade of homicide.
186. TEx. PENAL CODE §§ 15.01(c), 15.02(d), 15.03(d).
187. The offense of possession of criminal instruments (TEx. PENAL CoDE § 16.01)
proscribes the possession or providing of things specifically "designed, made, or
adapted" for criminal activity with intent or knowledge that they will be so used. It
thus includes part of what is known as the offense of "criminal facilitation" and will
include persons whose aid may not be sufficient for liability based on a complicity or
conspiracy theory. See Note, The Proposed Penal Law of New York, 64 COLUM. L.
REv. 1469, 1523-24 (1964).
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statute that applies to all offenses in the Code. An attempt consists of (1)
"an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to
effect the commission of the offense" that is (2) done "with specific intent
to commit [the] offense."' 88  Notwithstanding this language, subparagraph
(b) makes it clear that failure to commit the offense is not an essential ele-
ment. In other words, proof that the object offense was committed is not
a bar to prosecution for an attempt to commit the offense.
The absence of any detail in the general attempt definition in section
15.01 is an obvious concession to the extreme difficulty in drawing the line
between mere preparation and attempt, that is, finding a step toward per-
petration.'8 9 Apparently, the drafters intended that the question be decided
on the particular circumstances of each case. However, the failure to in-
clude at least some guidelines for the trier of fact seems unfortunate. The
new Code's extension of the scope of a number of object offenses, such as
arson, robbery, and theft, should tend to ameliorate the lack of specific
standards. But, judging -from the problems that courts generally have had
with similar general attempt definitions, the Texas courts are virtually on
their own in the cases which present "hard" facts or unusual situations.190
A troublesome problem in the law dealing with criminal attempt has been
the impossibility defense. This defense generally arises when the defend-
ant's conduct, unknown to him, could not have effected the commission of
the crime allegedly attempted. The proposed Texas provision would have
eliminated the impossibility defense by holding the actor responsible for at-
tempt on the basis of what he believed, rather than on what fortuitously
occurred. 191
It is not clear from the language of section 15.01, as enacted, whether
impossibility of commission of the object offense is a potential defense to
a charge of attempt. Arguably, an act of the defendant cannot "tend" to
effect its commission if the acts result in no object crime being committed.
For example, a defendant who buys talcum powder thinking it is heroin has
not "tended" to effect commission of a crime. On the other hand, if the
means used and the acts done are of the type designed to effect commission
of the crime, they do "tend" to effect its commission. Since an act that
"tends but fails" is sufficient, the fact that in retrospect we can say the crime
was impossible should make no difference if the acts can be considered more
than mere preparation, and evidence of intent to commit the offense can
188. TEx. PENAL CODE § 15.01(a).
189. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01, Comment at 39-47 (Tent. Draft No. 10,
1960). One is reminded of the rhetorical question asked by counsel in an appellate
argument, "Where, your honors, will you draw the line?", to which one justice re-
sponded immediately, "Why, counsel, in the right place, of course."
190. Prior cases in Texas interpreting special attempt statutes will be of little help.
See, e.g., Hines v. State, 458 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). The statutory lan-
guage of the new general attempt statute is similar to that of the prior New York law.
See People v. Rizzo, 246 N.Y. 334, 158 N.E. 888 (1927). That statute was interpreted
to require conduct physically proximate to consummation of the object offense. Id.
See also Note, supra note 187, at 1518-19. For the reasons stated in the Comment
to the Model Penal Code, supra note 189, the approach of the Proposed Draft seems
preferable.
191. PROPOSED DRAFT § 15.01.
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be established. Only instances of real impossibility such as those involving
attempts by persons who cannot be responsible for the completed offense
as a matter of law, or those in which no crime such as that allegedly at-
tempted exists-should be held to raise the defense.' 92
B. Conspiracy
Under section 15.02 a person is guilty of conspiracy when (1) "with in-
tent that a felony be committed," (2) "he agrees with one or more persons
that they or one or more of them engage in conduct that would constitute"
the felony, and (3) "he or one or more of them performs an overt act in
pursuance of the agreement." This section departs from the common-law
concept of conspiracy. The offense is limited to conspiracies that contem-
plate the commission of a felony rather than any criminal offense. 198 In
addition, a single actor clearly may be convicted of conspiracy by his act
of agreeing, even if those with whom he agrees cannot, either because they
feigned agreement or did not share the actor's intent.194  This so-called uni-
lateral approach to conspiratorial liability is carried through by provisions
providing that a conspirator's liability is not affected by the amenability to
prosecution of the other alleged co-conspirators.' 95  The only exception is
that in a prosecution of a multi-party conspiracy, the acquittal of all parties
except one bars further prosecution.' 96 Finally, the overt-act requirement
of the common law, proof of which is a practical necessity for evidentiary,
limitation, or venue purposes, has been made an essential element of the
offense.' 97
A person who is by law incapable of committing the object offense in
an individual capacity may nevertheless be guilty of a conspiracy to commit
it.198 But apparently the state could not make out a conspiracy between
only two parties to commit a crime which necessarily requires two parties
for its commission. For example, a husband could be guilty of a conspir-
acy with another man to commit rape of the wife, but a man and someone
else's wife could not be guilty of a conspiracy to commit bigamy.' 99 The
provision that "the object offense was actually committed" is no defense 200
is merely a statement of the established rule of non-merger of conspiracy
into the completed offense. Conspiracy, unlike attempt, is an offense of a
192. See LAFAVE & ScoTr 442.
193. At common law, a combination for the purpose of committing any crime or
a lawful act by unlawful means could be a conspiracy. Prior Texas law contained the
felony limitation with certain exceptions, e.g., conspiracy to violate the obscenity law.
Ch. 35, § 1, [1943] Texas Laws 38 (repealed).
194. Tax. PENAL CODE § 15.02(b) states that the agreement "may be inferred from
acts of the parties." Presumably, under the unilateral view taken in the Code, the act-
or's act of agreement can be inferred despite the absence of a "meeting of minds."
195. Id. § 15.02(c).
196. Id. § 15.02(c)(2).
197. Mere agreement to commit a crime is insufficient. Requiring an overt act in
addition should burden the prosecutor little, since cases in which a conspiracy could
be shown without proof of some act by one of the parties would be rare.
198. TEx. PENAL CODE § 15.02(c)(4).
199. The latter is an illustration of the so-called "Wharton Rule" which is applied
to offenses that require cooperative action.
200. TEX. PENAL CODE § 15.02(c)(5).
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distinctly different nature from the object offense, and thus allows prosecu-
tion and punishment for both.
C. Solicitation
The Code's introduction of the crime of solicitation to Texas penal law
in section 15.03 creates an offense for conduct that amounts to a request,
command, or attempted inducement of another to commit what is believed
to be a felony. The offense of solicitation fills a gap in the prior law and
alleviates the danger that the attempt or conspiracy statutes will be perverted
by pressure to include conduct that unequivocally demonstrates an intent
that a crime be committed, but is technically insufficient to establish attempt
or conspiracy.201 Impossibility of the commission of the offense by the per-
son solicited, or the inability to convict him of any offense is no defense.202
Solicitation, like conspiracy, is not merged into the completed offense,20 for
which the solicitor also may be liable under complicity principles. 20 4
D. The Renunciation Defense to Preparatory Offenses
The defendant in a prosecution for attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation has
an affirmative defense based on either a "voluntary and complete" renuncia-
tion of the criminal objective-by abandonment of attempt, countermand of
solicitation, or withdrawal from the conspiracy--or "affirmative action that
prevented the commission of the object offense. '20 5 Renunciation sufficient
to constitute a complete defense in cases in which the defendant does not
prevent commission of the object offense must be proven by the defendant
to be completely voluntary, and must not be "motivated in whole or in part"
either by increased awareness of the probability of detection or apprehen-
sion, recognition of greater difficulties in commission than were initially ap-
parent, or by a decision merely to postpone or to change "to another but
similar objective or victim. '206  However, even if the renunciation of the
defendant was insufficient to constitute a complete defense, the preparatory
offense of which the defendant was convicted is to be reduced by one grade
at the hearing on punishment if his incomplete renunciation was accompa-
nied by "substantial effort to prevent commission of the object offense. °2 0 7
V. SELECTED SPECIFIC OFFENSES
Little purpose would be served by a complete summary of the provisions
of the Code relating to specific offenses. Only those relating to homicide,
obscenity, and drugs are discussed herein. A comment should be made,
however, concerning the method which should be employed in using the
Code.
201. PROPosED DRAFr § 15.03, Comments at 139-40.
202. TEx. PENAL CODE § 15.03(c).
203. Id. § 15.03(c)(4).
204. See discussion of complicity, notes 100-03 supra, and accompanying text.
205. TEX. PENAL CODE 88 15.04(a), (b).
206. Id. § 15.04(c).
207. Id. § 15.04(d).
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Assume the accused was arrested after a bullet from a gun he had fired
into the side of a warehouse struck a flammable substance, causing a fire
that was extinguished before it damaged the building. The prosecuting at-
torney (or defense attorney after formal charges had been filed) would first
turn to title 7 entitled "Offenses Against Property," and would note that
arson and other property damage offenses are included in the first chapter
of that title. Section 28.02 defines arson as follows:
(a) A person commits an offense if he starts a fire or causes an ex-
plosion:
(1) without the effective consent of the owner and with intent to
destroy or damage the owner's building or habitation; or
(2) with intent to destroy or damage any building or habitation to
collect insurance for the damage or destruction.
(b) An offense under this section is a felony of the second degree, un-
less any bodily injury less than death is suffered by any person by rea-
son of the commission of the offense, in which event it is a felony of
the first degree.
Counsel would then break the offense down into its component elements:
(1) the starting of a fire or causing of an explosion; (2) without the owner's
effective consent (or with consent if to collect insurance); (3) with the in-
tent to destroy or damage; (4) the owner's building or habitation. He would
conclude that the state could establish element (1). By reference to the
definition of "effective consent" in the general definition section, 1.07, he
could probably assume that the evidence would establish element (2). To
decide whether element (3) could be proved, he must look first to the defi-
nition of "intentionally" in section 6.03(a), and will find that defendant
must be shown to have had the conscious objective to damage the building
when he fired the gun. Finally, he would note that the definition of the
term "building" used in element (4) is defined in the special definition sec-
tion of the property damage chapter to include any structure intended for
use in trade or manufacture, and, therefore, includes a warehouse.208 Coun-
sel would also note that the new arson statute does not contain the common-
law element that some burning of the building must actually occur. Ele-
ment (3) could become the focal point of counsel's analysis. If the accused
fired the gun in anger desiring only to put bullet holes in the building, he
may be liable, since the intent required does not relate to starting a fire
or the kind of damage, but only the intent to damage. But was his conduct
in starting the fire voluntary? By reference to section 6.01, counsel will
find that only the act of firing the gun need be voluntary, the actual result
need not be willed or intended unless so specified in the statute defining
the offense. But the result was totally unforeseen, so how could the defend-
ant be responsible as a cause? Reference to the causation section 6.04 an-
swers that: If the defendant had the requisite mental state for the offense
charged, it makes no difference that under the circumstances as he believed
them to be, a different offense was being committed. Counsel might an-
208. Id. § 28.01(2).
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ticipate that defendant's best defense will be a claim that he either did not
intend to damage the property, but was only reckless as to the risk of dam-
age, or that through a mistake of fact he thought the building was aban-
doned and not owned by anyone. This would point counsel to the general
defense sections or to other offenses such as reckless destruction of prop-
erty.209 With reference to the latter, a similar analysis would be made.
A. Criminal Homicide
Criminal homicide generally is the causing of the death of an individual,
and with two notable exceptions, the degree depends on the mental state
accompanying the defendant's conduct causing the death. 210 The types of
criminal homicide are murder, capital or aggravated murder, voluntary man-
slaughter, involuntary manslaughter, and criminally negligent homicide. 211
Murder, a first degree felony, is committed when a person either: (1)
"intentionally or knowingly causes" death; or (2) "intends to cause serious
bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes
death"; or (3) "commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous
to human life that causes" death during the commission, attempted commis-
sion, or flight from a felony. 212 Categories (1) and (2) are comparable
to the old murder with malice. The third category of murder perpetuates
the traditional form of objective liability for murder embodied in the felony-
murder doctrine. It is based on the notion that the willingness to engage
in certain kinds of dangerous conduct suffices to establish liability for mur-
der, notwithstanding the absence of any specific mental state as to death
as a result.213 Limiting the application of the doctrine to the person who
actually committed the act and not including liability for those acts com-
mitted by co-perpetrators is salutary.214 The drafters obviously intended to
exclude from the felony-murder rule accidental and not-to-be-anticipated fa-
talities caused by the accused. Whether they were successful depends on
the ultimate interpretation of the potentially confusing phrase "an act clearly
dangerous to human life" which apparently is intended to include those acts
that are patently dangerous, not from the standpoint of the accused, but of
the ordinary person. 215
Capital murder is a form of aggravated murder which may be committed
by a person who is guilty of murder in any of five different aggravating
circumstances: (1) the victim is a peace officer or fireman acting in the
line of duty when defendant knows his official capacity; (2) there is an in-
tentional murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit kid-
napping, burglary, robbery, aggravated rape, or arson; (3) the murder is
for hire (both the employer and the person employed are included); (4)
209. Id. § 28.04.
210. Id. § 19.01(a).
211. Id. § 19.01(b).
212. Id. § 19.02.
213. This is expressed in the shorthand of "implied malice" or "constructive intent."
214. Of course, co-perpetrators could be liable on a complicity theory. See discus-
sion of complicity at notes 100, 101 supra, and accompanying text.
215. See LaFave, supra note 31, at 547-48; Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 397 (1973).
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the murder is committed while the defendant is escaping or attempting to
escape from a penal institution; or (5) the murder is by a prisoner of an
employee of a penal institution. 216  Doubts concerning the constitutionality
of the capital murder statute have already been expressed.2 17
The voluntary manslaughter provision of section 19.04 is a restatement
of that part of the prior law's murder without malice provision which
included murder mitigated by reasonable provocation. It defines provoca-
tion adequate to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter to be conduct
of the deceased or "another acting with" him at the time of the killing that
would render a "person of ordinary temper" incapable of "cool reflection."
The use of the phrase "person of ordinary temper" apparently excludes a
test which takes into account individual variations in temperament or emo-
tional and mental stability. However, section 19.06 mandates consideration
of evidence not only of the "circumstances surrounding the killing," but of
that "going to show the condition of the mind of the accused at the time
of the offense." Although most jurisdictions support a test of provocation
that allows consideration of the "circumstances" as viewed from the stand-
point of the actor, they have resisted the injection of a larger element of
subjectivity into the test that would result from expansion of the circum-
stances to be considered to include evidence of defendant's mental or emo-
tional distress. 218  The ultimate resolution of the apparent conflict of Code
provisions on this point may depend on how seriously the Texas courts view
the Code's purported commitment to subjective culpability as a basis
of criminal liability, and how much they fear that a complete commitment
to that concept, at least in this area, would confuse the trier of fact or result
in sympathy verdicts.
Involuntary manslaughter includes homicides either committed recklessly
or caused by intoxication in the operation of a motor vehicle. 219 The homi-
cide-by-motor-vehicle provision is a limited application of the stepchild doc-
trine of felony-murder, that of unlawful act-manslaughter, which makes the
mental state of the defendant as to the death itself irrelevant. Stated an-
other way, the voluntary decision to drink ,(or the allowing of oneself to
become intoxicated) is sufficiently blameworthy to be treated as a form of
transferred intent. Even without this provision, the Code's elimination of
intoxication as a defense would make most vehicular homicides in these in-
stances involuntary manslaughter in any event.
Finally, by establishing the new offense of criminally negligent homicide,
the Code eliminates the degrees of negligent homicide in the prior law, and
the sufficiency of ordinary tort negligence as a basis for criminal liability.
220
B. Obscenity
The Code's provisions concerning obscenity treat perhaps the most con-
216. TEx. PENAL CODE § 19.03.
217. See notes 181-85 supra and accompanying text.
218. LAFAVE & ScoTr 578-79.
219. TEx. PENAL CODE § 19.05.
220. Id. § 19.07.
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troversial of the offenses which relate generally to the state's attempted reg-
ulation of matters not resulting in readily identifiable harm to persons, prop-
erty, or the public interest.
A growing feeling exists that the law should not attempt to legislate moral-
ity nor cure all the potential evils of society. 221 To a limited extent, this
feeling is evidenced by the new Code's elimination of "private" crimes, and
emphasis on criminalizing commercial ventures in the area of morals.222 Of-
fenses that punish conduct which is only offensive or immoral and does not
pose a serious threat to individuals or society have been attacked as doing
more harm than good. 28  The same suspicion has been expressed by many
toward obscenity legislation. Nonetheless, the legislature adopted a statute
in the new Code regulating the possession, distribution, exhibition, and par-
ticipation in "obscene" matter.224  The legislative decision to continue the
regulation of obscenity was vindicated by a United States Supreme Court
decision handed down only a week after the statute's passage, Miller v. Cal-
ifornia, in which the Court reaffirmed its previous position that obscenity
was not protected by the first amendment guarantee of freedom of expres-
sion. 225
The Code's obscenity statute (sections 43.21-43.24) contains three basic
offenses: (1) intentional and knowing display or distribution of obscene
matter with recklessness concerning whether another will be offended or
alarmed (a Class C misdemeanor); (2) commercial distribution or exhibi-
tion, possession for sale, distribution or exhibition, and participation in, ob-
scene matter (a Class B misdemeanor); and (3) sale, distribution, or dis-
play of "harmful material" (obscene to minors) to children under 17 (a
Class A misdemeanor). The latter two offenses are aggravated and
increased one grade if minors are employed in the enterprise. 226  "Obscene"
is defined in the statute as "having as a whole a dominant theme that: (A)
appeals to a prurient interest in sex, nudity, or excretion; (B) is patently
offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to
the description or representation of sex, nudity, or excretion; and (C) is ut-
terly without redeeming social value. '227  This definition is nearly identical
to the three-pronged test of )the prior Texas statute, except that the prede-
cessor statute limited what could be obscene to depictions of "sexual mat-
ters ' 228 rather than the "sex, nudity, or excretion" of the new section 43.21.
The new standard was not intended to change prior law, 229 which was based
on the constitutional test evolved by the United States Supreme Court prior
to its decision in Miller.
221. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 23, at 421-26.
222. For example, adultery is not a crime, nor is indecent exposure unless the of-
fender "is reckless about whether another is present who will be offended or alarmed
TEx. PENAL CODE § 21.08. Aggravated promotion of prostitution (id.
§ 43.04) and promotion of gambling (id. § 47.03) are third degree felonies.
223. See, e.g., H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 249-366 (1968).
224. TEx. PENAL CODE §§ 43.21-.24.
225. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
226. TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.23(c).
227. Id. § 43.21(1).
228. Ch. 468, § 1, [1969] Tex. Laws 1547 (repealed).
229. PRoPosED DRAFr § 43.21, Comments at 312.
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The Miller decision made two major changes in the constitutional test of
obscenity. It rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value" element
of the test of obscenity in favor of a condition that the whole work lack
"serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, ' 2s0 and also held that
hard core sexual conduct which is the object of state regulation "must be
specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively
construed."'231 In West v. State,2 32 a case involving a conviction for exhibit-
ing obscene matter under the old Texas statute, on remand to the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals for reconsideration in light of Miller, the Texas
court held that the statute and its successor in the new Code, section 43.21,
met the modified constitutional standard. The "utterly without redeeming
social value" condition of both statutes was easily found to be constitutional,
albeit unnecessarily narrow under the relaxed constitutional minimum of
Miller. But the court had some difficulty in deciding whether the Texas
obscenity legislation met the new "specifically defined" requirement of Mil-
ler. The court did not attempt to find a saving construction of the language
by reference to prior decisions under the statute, as many courts of other
jurisdictions have done, but instead determined that the term "sexual mat-
ters," which it found was functionally synonomous with "sex, nudity, or ex-
cretion" in the new statute, 233 was specific enough "as written," and did not
violate due process as being vague or overbroad. Operating under the as-
sumption that "a statute could define all conceivable sexual conduct, and
thereby satisfy the requirement of a specific definition," 234 the court held
that the term "sexual matters" was intended by the legislature to include,
and did in its ordinary meaning include, "all sexual matters,' 23 5 by which
the court meant all conceivable sexual conduct. As a result, it met the Mil-
ler standard of specificity.
If Miller is to mean anything, it should be given a different reading from
that of the Texas court. It is one thing to conclude that a state may pro-
hibit all obscenity, which Miller did. But it is quite another to say that
230. 413 U.S. at 24.
231. Id. See also United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8 mm. Film, 413 U.S.
123, 130 n.7 (1973), in which the Court stated that it is "prepared to construe" the
federal obscenity legislation as being limited to "patently offensive representations or
descriptions of that specific 'hard-core' sexual conduct given as examples in Miller v.
California," i.e., "ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated" and
"masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." 413 U.S. at
25.
232. No. 45,090 (Tex. Crim. App., Feb. 13, 1974).
233. "We give a like construction to the language used by the Legislature in its
drafting of Section 43.21, Subsection 1, supra, wherein it refers to the 'description or
representation of sex, nudity, or excretion.' Certainly at a minimum such language in-
cludes each stated type of conduct above construed as being within the intent expressed
by the term 'sexual matters' in Article 527, V.A.P.C." Id. at 5.
234. Id. at 4.
235. Id. A comprehensive definition of matter to be regulated is not precluded by
Miller. The Court's "plain examples of what a state statute could define for regula-
tion" consistent with the "specific definition" requirement, supra note 231, were not in-
tended to be exclusive. The Court suggests that the Oregon statute (ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 167.060 (1971)), for example, which includes detailed descriptions of nudity, sexual
conduct, sexual excitement, and sadomasochistic abuse, would pass constitutional muster
insofar as specificity of definition is concerned. 413 U.S. at 24 n.6. However, the
Texas obscenity statute, like the California statute involved in Miller, does not on its
face describe any particular conduct.
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it may make portrayal of all sexual matters potentially obscene, which Mil-
ler did not do, but which West apparently does. There is little wonder the
court expressed doubts that the "specifically defined" requirement of Miller
would operate to make a statute any less vague, or provide any better notice
to "purveyors. ' 23 6  As interpreted by the Texas court, it probably will not.
Indeed, the court acknowledged that its construction of the phrase "sexual
matters," and its apparent synonym, "sex, nudity, or excretion," would in-
clude portrayals of "some sexual matters, such as courtship" that factually
would never be found obscene. 287  If so, the statute, as interpreted by the
court, arguably is infected with the precise defect of vagueness and over-
generality that the Miller decision condemned. Reference to the decisions
of other jurisdictions in the post-Miller scramble would have counseled a
seemingly more certain approach. 23 8  The West court could have found that
prior Texas decisions provide an adequate, albeit more permissive, standard,
namely, portrayal of explicit or overt sexual activity including exposure of
genitalia between persons of the same or different sexes 2 3 9 -conduct which
in certain circumstances may be criminal.240  But this approach was effec-
tively foreclosed by the decision of the court in West ,to indulge in a textual
interpretation designed to give the obscenity statute a new post-Miller pros-
pective (and less permissive) definition. 241  In doing so, the court appears
236. West v. State, No. 45,090, at 4 (Tex. Crim. App., Feb. 13, 1974).
237. Id. at 5.
238. Numerous state courts have upheld state obscenity legislation by finding an au-
thoritative construction in prior judicial decisions. See, e.g., Rhodes v. State, 283 So.
2d 351 (Fla. 1973); Commonwealth v. Claflin, 298 N.E.2d 888 (Mass. 1973); State
ex rel. Keating v. "Vixen," 35 Ohio St. 2d 215, 301 N.E.2d 880 (1973). See also Red-
lich v. Capri Cinema, Inc., 349 N.Y.S.2d 697 (App. Div. 1973). However, some juris-
dictions have left the specific definition of obscenity to the legislature. See, e.g., Stroud
v. State, 300 N.E.2d 100 (Ind. 1973); State v. Shreveport News Agency, Inc., 287 So.
2d 464 (La. 1973).
239. See, e.g., Sharp v. State, 495 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Thacker v.
State, 490 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); West v. State, 489 S.W.2d 597 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1972); Hunt v. State, 475 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
240. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.07 ("Public Lewdness"). A Texas court of civil
appeals, in upholding an injunction against exhibition and distribution of obscenity, sug-
gested that the Texas obscenity statute could be read as incorporating by reference the
conduct proscribed as "public lewdness"-acts of sexual intercourse, deviate sexual in-
tercourse, sexual contact, and sodomous acts with animals or fowl. Richards v. State,
497 S.W.2d 770, 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973). Although Miller comes close
to saying that the specific conduct, the depiction of which may constitutionally be made
obscene, is the same as that which may constitutionally be proscribed as criminal, it
did not so hold. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1973). The Court in
fact stated that "the States have greater power to regulate nonverbal, physical conduct
than to suppress depictions or descriptions of the same behavior." Id. at 26 n.8. Pub-
lic lewdness may be made criminal because it is patently offensive by definition, but
its depiction may not be without some "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value". in the context in which presented. It could be argued, however, that the admis-
sion by the court in West that depictions of matter such as abortion and birth control
could technically, if not factually, be obscene under the Texas statute reinforces doubts
concerning its holding. Since a general prohibition of abortion and birth control is
impermissible as an invasion of the fourth amendment right to privacy, Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), quaere
whether their depiction should ever be obscene?
241. Aside from possible objections to the West decision on federal constitutional
grounds, other questions could be raised as suggested by the following:
the judicial amendment of a legislative statute so as to specifically de-
scribe conduct criminally penalized seems to me to raise serious ques-
tions of true judicial legislation. As another concurring opinion suggests,
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to have increased, rather than to have diminished, doubts concerning the
constitutionality of the new Texas obscenity law.
C. Drugs
The Texas Controlled Substances Act,242 not enacted as part of the Penal
Code but as an amendment to the civil statutes concerning drugs, establishes
a new structure of drug offenses based on an elaborate classification scheme.
The Act defines offenses relating to the manufacture, delivery, possession,
or fraud in connection with controlled substances, and possession of
controlled substance paraphernalia. The grade of offense is determined by
which of the four "penalty groups" in which the substance involved is classi-
fied, and punishment is set by the table of punishments taken from the Penal
Code. The resulting structure of offenses and punishments is outlined in Ap-
pendix C.
Marijuana receives special treatment. 243  The severity of offenses relating
to its possession and delivery have been reduced substantially from the prior
law.244  The reduced offenses will operate prospectively and apply only to
offenses committed after August 27, 1973, the effective date of the Act.
Those parts of the Act that would have required the trial court, on motion
of defendant, to resentence any defendant previously convicted in a mari-
juana case and other drug offenders previously convicted with cases pending
on appeal have been declared unconstitutional.245
VI. CONCLUSION
The existence of theoretical and practical limitations on the capacity of
legislative draftsmanship to achieve a clear definition of crimes that is com-
pletely rational and easily applied should be obvious. Among these limita-
tions are a lack of consensus concerning theories of human behavior and
the proper objectives of the criminal law, the pressure for compromise cre-
why this standard of conduct [the examples stated in Miller] and not in-
stead the terms of the Oregon or Hawaii statutes or the City of New Or-
leans ordinance?
Rather than re-interpret our obscenity statute so as in effect to amend
it, rather than give it a prospective interpretation so as to regulate future
conduct (but exempt pre-Miller conduct), the majority has, it appears to
me, adopted the most sensible approach to solution of the shambles of
our obscenity laws wrought by the new Miller standards: We have left
the specific definition and regulation of obscenity to the legislature.
State v. Shreveport News Agency, Inc., 287 So. 2d 464, 471 (La. 1973) (Tate, J., con-
curring).
242. Tax. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15 (Supp. 1974).
243. Id. §§ 4.05, 4.06.
244. Compare ch. 1023, §§ 1-4, [1971] Tex. Laws 3069 (Tex. Penal Code art.
725b, repealed 1973) with the Texas Controlled Substance Act, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 4476-15 (Supp. 1974).
245. Ex parte Giles, 502 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (§ 6.01--drug of-
fenses generally); State ex rel. Smith v. Blackwell, 500 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App.
1973) (§ 4.06-marijuana). Another case held that an individual tried on the effec-
tive date of the Controlled Substance Act for possession of less than two ounces of




ated by political reality and the legislative process, and the inherent short-
comings of verbal formulations in achieving precision and eliminating am-
biguity. Of course, a rational law of crimes is only a part of the response
needed to solve the problems and fulfill the expectations of our creaking
criminal justice system. This is acknowledged by the drafters of the pro-
posed penal code, who observe: "The penal law is but one of several impor-
tant tools necessary to govern society, and its reform, although essential, is
by no means sufficient. The draft code is offered, however, as the logical
beginning of what we hope will be a continuing law reform effort. 2 46  This
















5 yrs. 99 yrs./life
2 yrs. 20 yrs.




* Or double the amount gained in lieu hereof.
ENIHNcFi PuNSHMENTS
Conviction
rand 2d previous conviction
Third Felony for felony occurring after
1st previous conviction
" Ist degree
Second Felony 2d degree
L 3d degree
Class A Misdemeanor (any previous Class A Misde-
meanor or Felony)
Class B Misdemeanor (any previous Class A or B Mis-
















15 yrs. 99 yrs./Life
as 1st degree felon
as 2d degree felon
90 days 1 yr.
30 days 180 days
246. Committee Foreword to PROPOSED DRAF-r at IX.
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APENmrnx B








21.05 Aggravated Sexual Abuse
22.03 Deadly Assault on a Peace
Officer










21.09 Rape of a Child
21.10 Sexual Abuse of a Child
22.04 Injury to a Child
28.02 Arson
28.03 Criminal Mischief (loss of
$10,000 or more)
29.02 Robbery
30.02 Burglary (other than habitation)
31.03 Theft ($10,000 or more)
32.21 Forgery or Counterfeiting (in-
volving money, stamps, stocks,
bonds, etc.)
32.45 Misapplication of Fiduciary
Property or Property of Finan-
cial Institution ($10,000 or
more)
36.02 Bribery (acceptance of a bribe
by a public official)
38.07 Escape (with deadly weapon)
38.10 Implements for Escape(deadly weapon)
43.05 Compelling Prostitution























Interference with Child Custody
Criminal Nonsupport (repeat or
while outside the state)
Criminal Mischief (loss be-
tween $2,000 and $10,000)
Burglary of Vehicles
Theft (value greater than $200
but less than $10,000)
Section Offense
31.05 Theft of Trade Secret
31.07 Unauthorized Use of Vehicle
32.21 Forgery (will, deed, mortgage,
ceck, credit card, etc., i.e.,
documents of commerce and
property transfer)
32.33 Hindering Secured Creditors
(removal of property)
32.43 Commercial Bribery
32.44 Rigging Publicly Exhibited
Contest (connected with bet-
ting or wagering on contest)
32.31 Credit Card Abuse
32.45 Misapplication of Fiduciary
Property or Property of Fi-
nancial Institution (between
$200.00 and $10,000)
32.46 Securing Execution of Docu-
ment by Deception
32.47 Fraudulent Destruction, Re-
moval or Concealment of
Writing (will, deed, mortgage,
security instrument, etc.)
36.02 Bribery (public servant or party
official)
36.03 Coercion of Public Servant or
Voter (aggravated)
36.05 Tampering with Witness
36.06 Retaliation
37.03 Aggravated Perjury
37.10 Tampering with Governmental
Record (intent to defraud or
harm)
38.03 Resisting Arrest or Search
(aggravated)
38.07 Escape (from arrest or con-
finement)
38.08 Permitting or Facilitating Escape
(aggravated)
38.10 Implements of Escape
38.11 Bail Jumping and Failure to
Appear (felony charge)
39.02 Official Misconduct (involving
things of value taken from the
government)
43.04 Aggravated Promotion of
Prostitution
43.24 Sale, Distribution, or Display of
Harmful Material to Minor
(aggravated)
46.02 Unlawfully Carrying a Weapon
(where liquor is served)
46.05 Unlawful Possession of Firearm
by Felon
46.06 Prohibited Weapons (possession
of switchblade knife or
knuckles)
47.03 Gambling Promotion
47.04 Keeping a Gambling Place
47.05 Communicating Gambling
Information






19.07 Criminally Negligent Homicide
21.07 Public Lewdness
22.01 Assault (causing injury)
22.07 Terroristic Threat (affecting
public)
25.05 Criminal Nonsupport
28.03 Criminal Mischief (loss more
than $20 but less than $200)
30.03 Burglary of Coin-Operated
Machine
30.05 Criminal Trespass (in habi-
tation)
31.03 Theft (Between $20 and $200)
32.21 Forgery
32.22 Criminal Simulation
32.32 False Statement to Obtain
Property or Credit
32.33 Hindering Secured Creditors
32.34 Fraud in Insolvency
32.35 Receiving Deposit, Premium, or
Investment in Failing Financial
Institution
32.42 Deceptive Business Practices
32.44 Rigging Public Contest
32.45 Misapplication of Fiduciary
Property or Property of Finan-
cial Institution (less than
$200.00)
32.47 Fraudulent Destruction, Re-
moval, or Concealment of
Writing
36.03 Coercion of Public Servant or
Voter
36.04 Improper Influence
36.07 Compensation for Past
Official Behavior
36.08 Gift to Public Servant by
Person Subject to His
Jurisdiction
36.09 Offering Gift to Public Servant
37.02 Perjury
37.09 Tampering With or Fabricating
Physical Evidence
37.10 Tampering With Governmental
Record
37.11 Impersonating Public Servant
38.03 Resisting Arrest or Search




38.08 Permitting or Facilitating Escape
38.11 Bail Jumping and Failure to
Appear
38.12 Barratry





39.03 Misuse of Official Information
42.06 False Alarm or Report
42.09 Desecration of Venerated
Object
42.10 Abuse of Corpse
42.11 Cruelty to Animals
43.03 Promotion of Prostitution
43.23 Commercial Obscenity
(aggravated)
43.24 Sale, Distribution, or Display
of Harmful Material to Minors
46.02 Unlawful Carrying Weapons
46.04 Places Weapons Prohibited
(educational institution or
polling place)
46.07 Unlawful Transfer of Firearm





































Criminal Mischief (loss between
$5 and $20)
Theft (between $5 and $20)
Endless Chain Scheme
False Report to Peace Officer
Evading Arrest
Disorderly Conduct (display or
discharge firearm in public)
Riot













Criminal Mischief (loss less
than $5)
Criminal Trespass
Failure to Identify as Witness
Bail Jumping and Failure to
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2 oz. or less:
Class B. Misd.
Persons authorized to manufacture or dispense controlled substances who are
guilty of irregularities in connection with dispensing or maintenance of records are
guilty of a second degree felony. Fraud in connection with controlled substances is
also separately defined. Controlled Substances Act § 4.09.
* Texas Controlled Substances Act, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15 (Supp.
1974).
Paraphernalia
Class A Misd.
Class A Misd.
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